

'very nearly as good as our own'

The Portuguese Army in the Peninsular War

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## Introduction

1 August 1808 marks the first time that Wellington addresses the British Government regarding the topic of the Portuguese army and its potential role in the long and arduous campaign that was about to start in the Iberian Peninsula.<sup>1</sup> Writing from the HMS Donegal, while the first British troops were disembarking in Mondego Bay and with the outcome of the operation far from clear, the Duke communicated to Castlereagh his views on the future conduct of the war against the French. Assuming a British victory and the eviction of the French forces from Portugal, he goes on to state that 'Great Britain ought to raise, organize, and pay an army in Portugal, consisting of 30,000 Portuguese troops, which might be easily raised at an early period'. Together with 20,000 British, of which five thousand should be cavalry, this army 'would give Great Britain the preponderance in the conduct of the war in the Peninsula'.<sup>2</sup> This dispatch restates the opinions communicated to Major General Spencer on 26 July 1808, regarding the way forward in the contest in the Peninsula: 'and I must observe that nothing we can do can be so useful to them as to get possession of and organize a good army in Portugal.'<sup>3</sup> Eight months later, as part of the preparations for his return as Commander of the British forces in Portugal, Wellington addressed again the importance of the Portuguese army in his 'Memorandum on the Defence of Portugal'.<sup>4</sup> This memorandum, classified by Charles Esdaile as 'prescient' and which, according to this author, was one of the factors contributing to Wellington's return to favour with the Government and hence to a position of command, emphasised again the importance the Duke attributes to the Portuguese army.<sup>5</sup> In his own words, 'I have always been of opinion that Portugal might be defended, whatever might be the result of the contest in Spain'. This defence would be achieved by adding to the British troops, 40,000 militias and 30,000 Portuguese regular troops which would preclude, that a force of less than 100,000 Frenchmen would be able to conquer Portugal. This allied force, if Spain would not surrender to France, would then, 'if it could be put into a state of activity ... be highly useful to the Spaniards, and might eventually have decided the contest.'<sup>6</sup>

As per the above, the requirement for a Portuguese army and its importance for the successful conduct of the war in the Peninsula, were clear to Wellington. At least up until the end of Masséna's

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<sup>1</sup> Although only the Viscount of Wellington after 26 August 1809 and Duke of Wellington after 3 May 1814, Sir Arthur Wellesley will be referred to as the Duke of Wellington throughout this work.

<sup>2</sup> J. Gurwood (ed.), *The Dispatches of FM the Duke of Wellington* Volume 4 (London, 1836), p. 55. Henceforth identified as WD.

<sup>3</sup> WD Volume 4, pp. 47-48. The 'them' referring to the Spaniards.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 261-263.

<sup>5</sup> C. Esdaile, *The Peninsular War – A New History* (London, 2003), p. 193.

<sup>6</sup> WD Volume 4, p. 261.

invasion of Portugal, the Portuguese army can indeed be considered as a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for the defeat of the French in any attempt to reconquer Portugal and drive the British from the Peninsula. This army would not only have to be raised and organized but it would also have to be able to face the French in battle. Further to that, a look at the order of battle of the major engagements in the Peninsula, emphasises, yet again, the importance of the Portuguese units: ignoring Vimeiro, Talavera and Barrosa, where the Portuguese were not present or their numbers were insignificant, we can see that the percentage of Portuguese troops in the field in the Anglo-Portuguese army varies between a maximum of forty nine percent and a minimum of thirty two percent, demonstrating how meaningful their presence was.<sup>7</sup> These factors, per se, clearly frame the significance of this subject and the need of deeper analysis and research into the Portuguese army for a better understanding of a complex but fascinating topic such as the Peninsular War. Being a Portuguese national, and therefore, having access to primary sources outside of the reach of non-Portuguese speakers, I consider myself in a fortunate position to help shed some more light on the role of the Portuguese army in the Peninsular War, which this dissertation aims to achieve.

In terms of literature review, it is inescapable to start with Sir Charles Oman, a professional historian, Oxford Professor and by his treatment of the Peninsular War an early example of modern scholarship. The most famous, and probably a reference of most of the military histories on this topic, is his commanding seven volume work *A History of the Peninsular War*.<sup>8</sup> These works can be evaluated as summarised by Griffith in his review of Oman's work: 'It is, nevertheless, still fair to say that Oman's was the best account of the so-called 'Peninsular War' to be published in any country. It has never yet been superseded and seems unlikely to be in the future.'<sup>9</sup> It will be used throughout this work as a general reference, particularly its appendices with data on the orders of battle and casualty figures for the battles of the Peninsular War. Esdaile's work, *The Peninsular War – A new History* through its integration of military, diplomatic, political and social events, provides much needed context to some of the cardinal moments of the conflict, while simultaneously introducing the perspective of the Spanish (and to a much lesser degree of the Portuguese) into the narrative. In terms of works focused on more specific topics, Fuente's work on D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz is crucial to understand the role of the man who Wellington considered 'the best instrument' in the

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<sup>7</sup> A list of battles of the Peninsular War together with the percentage of Portuguese troops in relation to the Anglo-Portuguese army can be found in Appendix I. The values mentioned here are 49% for Albuera and 32% for Fuentes d'Oñoro respectively.

<sup>8</sup> C. Oman, *A History of the Peninsular War* Volumes I to VII. Henceforth identified as Oman followed by Volume number.

<sup>9</sup> P. Griffith (ed.), *A History of the Peninsular War* Volume IX (London, 1999), p. 31.

organization of the Portuguese army and in the running of the Council of the Regency.<sup>10</sup> Muir's *Salamanca 1812*, apart from an excellent description of the battle, is one of the few works to use data as a basis for analysis and will be used throughout as a reference and validation on these topics.<sup>11</sup>

Regarding Portuguese primary sources, this work will rely heavily on the decrees issued by the Council of Regency or from the Portuguese Court in Brazil. These can be found in the *Collecção da Legislação Portuguesa*, crucial for an understanding of the reorganization of the Portuguese army.<sup>12</sup> In the same vein, Beresford's 'Ordens do Dia' from 1809 to 1814 provide a rich and valuable insight in the day-to-day running of the Portuguese army as well as of the specific issues surrounding its reform and operations. The military almanacs of the years 1811 to 1813, roughly the equivalent to the *British Army Lists* and the *London Gazette*, provide a source for the organization and structure of the Portuguese army and will be mainly used for assessing the role of the British officers employed in the Portuguese service. As for English primary sources, the major work consulted will be Gurwood's *Wellington Dispatches and Supplementary Dispatches*. Given that the Duke was not only the Commander in Chief of the British forces but also Marshal General of the Portuguese army, and therefore outranked Beresford in the Portuguese army, his dispatches are absolutely fundamental for a comprehension of the military and political aspects of the Peninsular War relating to the Portuguese army.

Regarding contemporary sources, two British officers in the Portuguese service have been selected. These are William Warre, one of Beresford's aides-de-camp and one regimental officer, John Blakiston, a captain in the 17<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment.<sup>13</sup>

Due to its importance, a discussion on the lack of contemporary Portuguese sources is required. Although tens of thousands of Portuguese were directly involved in the Peninsular War, there is no single memoir, journal or set of published letters available to the public. Unfortunately, there is no written evidence through which a researcher can glance the events and the experience, not only of battle but of the functioning of the army, through Portuguese eyes. Putting aside the drastic notion that the Portuguese Officer corps was illiterate, we must look elsewhere for an explanation.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> F. Fuente, *D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz, Conde da Feira 1769-1827. O organizador da luta contra Napoleão* (Lisbon, 2010). For Wellington's quote see *WD* Volume 6 p. 350.

<sup>11</sup> R. Muir, *Salamanca 1812* (2001) Kindle Version

<sup>12</sup> A. Silva, *Collecção da Legislação Portuguesa desde a última Compilação das Ordenações* (Lisbon, 1826) several volumes.

<sup>13</sup> Respectively W. Warre *Letters from the Peninsula 1808-1812* (Lisbon, 2009) Portuguese version; J. Blakiston, *Twelve Years' Military Adventure in three quarters of the Globe* (London, 1829).

<sup>14</sup> See page 10 for opinions both of Wellington and Beresford on the Portuguese officers. Had illiteracy been found amongst their many defects, this would, no doubt, have been highlighted.

Following the defeat of the French in 1814, Beresford, together with some other British officers, remained in the Portuguese service. In 1820 a military coup in Portugal, the so-called Liberal Revolution, took advantage of Beresford's absence in Brazil, to overthrow the Council of Regency and expel all British officers still serving with the Portuguese army. Even with the return of the King from Brazil in 1821, the political situation did not stabilize. His death in 1826 triggered a succession crisis, which led to a Civil War from 1832 to 1834.<sup>15</sup> As portrayed by this brief description of the events following the Peninsular War, the attention of the officer corps was focused on the military and political situation in Portugal. Furthermore, the single contemporary work on military topics I could find, is a book by Verissimo António Ferreira da Costa, wholly dedicated to a criticism of Beresford's Orders of the Day.<sup>16</sup> In a spirited attack on Beresford, and through him on the British officers who served in the Portuguese army, Major Costa accuses Beresford of being a despot and of clearly favouring his countrymen to the detriment of the Portuguese officers. Although it is impossible to ascertain how widespread or popular were these views in the Officer corps and in the Portuguese society in general, as no other works exist for a comparison, it is nevertheless important as proving the existence of a post-war anti-British mentality, which worked, no doubt, against the publication of accounts about the Peninsular War.

In terms of structure, this dissertation is divided into three main chapters, namely the resurgence of the Portuguese army, its battlefield performance and finally its operational relevance in the Peninsular War. The first chapter will focus on the steps taken by the Portuguese Council of Regency to re-establish a national army after the signing of the Convention of Sintra.<sup>17</sup> The approach devised for this reform and the actual structure of the different arms will be explored through the decrees issued and will be complemented with Beresford's Orders of the Day.<sup>18</sup> Given that the Portuguese army served as a combined force under Wellington together with the British army, the Duke's dispatches and orders of the day also need to be factored in when looking at the Portuguese army. Based on military almanacs for the years 1811 to 1813, this chapter will also analyse the role played by the British officers, other than Beresford, in the reorganization and conduct of the army. To better comprehend battlefield performance and operational relevance, the origins and circumstances surrounding the resurgence of the Portuguese army need to be understood.

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<sup>15</sup> J. Matoso (ed.), *História de Portugal*, Volume 5, (Lisbon, 1993), pp. 45-94.

<sup>16</sup> V. Costa, *Analyse das Ordens do Dia de Beresford*, (Lisbon, 1820)

<sup>17</sup> The Convention of Sintra, signed 30 August 1808 between the British and French armies, marked the end of the occupation of Portugal by the Napoleonic forces. Its full text can be found in WD Volume 4, pp. 127-132.

<sup>18</sup> William Carr Beresford (1768-1854) British military officer appointed as Marshal and Commander in Chief of the Portuguese army in early March 1809, position he held past the end of the Peninsular War.

The chapter on battlefield performance will focus on two different approaches, with one based on documentary evidence in the form of dispatches, contemporary accounts and existing historiography and its discussion, and another one based on an analysis of existing data on battlefield casualties. This second stream will test the hypothesis of a normal distribution of casualties between the Portuguese and British units, with the purpose of getting a better understanding of the battle worthiness and employment of the Portuguese units in the field. A data-based analysis of battles is extremely rare in the historiography of the Peninsula and should provide a renewed view on this topic.<sup>19</sup>

The last chapter is dedicated to the discussion of the operational relevance of the Portuguese army in the conduct of the Peninsular War. This analysis will focus on two main periods: from the Convention of Sintra up to the end of the Massena's invasion, the high-water mark of the French efforts to dislodge the British from the Peninsula and to reoccupy Portugal, and the period up to the end of the War. While the Peninsula was the only theatre of operations for Portugal, this was not true of the French and, although in a smaller measure, of the British. The relevance of the Portuguese army is better discussed by relating events happening in and outside of the theatre, like the War of the Fifth Coalition, the invasion of Russia or the War of 1812 and the changing dynamics of the relationship between Great Britain, Portugal and Spain.

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<sup>19</sup> Rory Muir is one of the exceptions as demonstrated by his two of his works, namely *The experience of battle in the age of Napoleon* and *Salamanca 1812*.

## Chapter 1 – The Resurgence of the Portuguese Army

This chapter will provide a chronological overview of the major steps taken in the resurgence of the Portuguese army, focusing on the way its different combat arms were organized, and highlighting differences to the British structure. It will also look at the key participants in the reorganization, including the role played by British officers, other than Beresford and the Duke. Finally, it will analyse the force composition decided upon by Wellington, in its unique form, to combine Anglo-Portuguese units under the same formation. As this chapter will demonstrate, although relying heavily on multi-national integration and cooperation, the Duke's organization of the Anglo-Portuguese forces turned out surprisingly effective.

Following the Convention of Sintra of 30 August 1808, effectively removing the French from Portugal, Hew Dalrymple re-established the Council of Regency as the legitimate governing body on the Portuguese mainland, on 18 September.<sup>20</sup> The military situation encountered by the Regency was, to say the least, dire. The invasion of the country by the Franco-Spanish forces in November 1807, had led to the escape of the Court to Brazil, which meant an exodus of fifteen thousand Portuguese, mostly of the higher classes of the state. Not only was the country deprived of most of its leading personalities, but the French also took the opportunity to dismantle the Portuguese military. Portugal was stripped of horses and weaponry, the army was demobilized and sent home, and Junot created the *Légion Portugaise*, a corps of around nine thousand Portuguese soldiers and officers. This unit was sent to France and was to serve under Napoléon for the next six years, until its destruction in Russia.<sup>21</sup> The result of all these actions was to leave Portugal effectively disarmed and without any military organization.

On its return to power, the Council lost no time in trying to re-establish a Portuguese army. The basis for the reorganization was a plan from 1806, created after lengthy discussions following the disastrous War of the Oranges of 1801 with Spain (although never implemented before the French invasion of 1807), which divided the Portuguese army into three classes of units: regular, or first line units; militias; and *ordenanças* (probably best translated as Home Guard units). The regular units were organized into three divisions, North, South, and Centre, each comprised of:

- four brigades of infantry, each composed of two infantry regiments;
- one brigade of cavalry, composed of four regiments;

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<sup>20</sup> Silva, *Collecção da Legislação Portuguesa 1802-1810*, pp. 603-605.

<sup>21</sup> For a description of the (mis)adventures of the *Légion Portugaise* see J. Elting, *Swords around a Throne – Napoleon's Grande Armée* (Da Capo Press, 1997) pp. 366-368.

- one regiment of artillery.

This surprisingly modern organization, which included brigades and divisions mirroring what was happening in Europe, was complemented by forty-eight regiments of militia and twenty-four brigades of ordenanças, each corresponding to a recruitment district (recruitment was by conscription), responsible to provide the men for the regular and militia units.<sup>22</sup> In the decree from 14 October 1808, the Portuguese army was re-formed according to the aforementioned organization. Innovating on the previous plan, six battalions of Caçadores (literally hunters) were added, which constituted the light infantry units of the Portuguese army.<sup>23</sup> In terms of the different unit types, the Portuguese formations had the following structure: each line infantry regiment consisted of two battalions, each containing one grenadier company and four fusilier companies of one hundred and fifty-two men, which, including the regimental headquarters, totalled 1,556 men per regiment. Each battalion of Caçadores was comprised of six companies of one hundred and twelve men, which, including the battalion staff, totalled 695 men per battalion.<sup>24</sup> A cavalry regiment consisted of four squadrons, of two companies each of seventy-two men, totalling, with the regimental headquarters included, 597 cavalymen. Each artillery regiment was composed of a company of miners, pontoniers, bombardiers and of seven companies of artillerymen, each of one hundred and twelve men, totalling, plus staff, 1,148 men. As for the militia regiments, these were composed of two battalions of four companies each, plus one company of grenadiers (not assigned to any battalion), each of one hundred and twelve men, which, adding regimental headquarters, brought the total to 1,101 men per regiment.<sup>25</sup> Outside of this organization, the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, composed of two battalions of light infantry, completed the roster of Portuguese units.<sup>26</sup> This was mostly the structure and table of organization and equipment (TO&E) encountered by Beresford when he joined the Portuguese army in March 1809. In terms of major organizational changes introduced by Beresford during the Peninsular War, the following deserve to be highlighted: the extinction of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion and the creation of six additional battalions of Caçadores on 20 April 1811, the creation of a militarized artillery train battalion and the transfer of the companies of miners and pontoniers from the artillery regiments to the Engineers, both on 8 October 1812.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> F. Gil, *A Infantaria Portuguesa na Guerra da Península*, (Lisbon, 1912) Primeira Parte, pp. 128-131.

<sup>23</sup> Silva, *Collecção da Legislação Portuguesa 1802-1810*, pp. 622-626.

<sup>24</sup> For the organization of the Caçadores, see Silva, *Collecção da Legislação Portuguesa 1802-1810*, pp. 622-626, 781-784 and A. Santos, *Collecção das Ordens do Dia* (Lisbon, 1810), pp. 28-29.

<sup>25</sup> The organization portrayed here for Line Infantry, Cavalry and Militia, can be found in Silva, *Collecção da Legislação Portuguesa 1802-1810*, pp. 622-626, 781-784.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 758-760.

<sup>27</sup> For the Caçadores battalions, see Silva, *Collecção da Legislação Portuguesa 1811-1820*, p. 44, for the changes in the Artillery see, *ibid.* pp. 188-190.

Regarding major differences in organization between the British and Portuguese armies, the following stand out: firstly, a lack of Portuguese horse artillery, probably due to a shortage of suitable horses, as there were always difficulties in finding animals both to the cavalry as well as to the artillery. Secondly, numerically stronger Portuguese infantry regiments, as the two battalions per regiment were planned to be used as a single unit, instead of the single British battalion. And finally, the larger ratio of light infantry to line infantry in the Portuguese army, particularly after the creation of the additional six battalions of Caçadores in 1811, giving a percentage of around twenty percent of light infantry to line in typical brigades consisting of two line regiments and a Caçadores battalion versus a much smaller percentage in the British brigades, around ten percent, provided by the light companies of the British battalions and the companies of the 5<sup>th</sup> Battalion, 60<sup>th</sup> Regiment.

As the relative few changes instituted by Beresford show, the major issues with the Portuguese army were not in terms of its organization, but in terms of its execution. By the end of 1808 it became clear that Portugal did not possess neither the number, nor the quality of officers required to raise such a large army, commencing with the position of commander in chief. To that effect, and not for the first time in the history of Portugal, Great Britain was invited by the Prince Regent on 9 January 1809 to nominate a commanding officer for the Portuguese army.<sup>28</sup> Although Wellington was Portugal's first choice, it was Beresford who ended up being accepted, with the agreement that he was free to bring more British officers to serve in the Portuguese army.<sup>29</sup> The opinion of the Duke on the Portuguese officers is provided in his dispatch of 18 November 1809:

The officers of the Portuguese army have for many years done little or no duty. Their country having, with trifling and short exceptions, been at peace since the year 1763, they were generally throughout their service employed in the same garrison, if they remained with their regiments; or they lived with their families at home.<sup>30</sup>

Beresford, from his side seemed to agree with Wellington:

....but here long habits of disregard to duty and of consequent laziness make it not only difficult but almost impossible to induce the senior officers of the service to enter into any regular and continued attention to the duties of their situations, and really I have seen that neither reward nor punishment will induce them to bear up against fatigue.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> S. Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil 1777-1834*, (Lisbon, 1893), Tomo V, Parte I, pp. 389-390.

<sup>29</sup> As announced on 23 March 1809, see Santos, *Collecção das Ordens do Dia Anno 1809* (Lisbon, 1809) pp. 3-4.

<sup>30</sup> WD, Volume 5, p. 270.

<sup>31</sup> Gurwood *Wellington Supplementary Dispatches*, Volume 6, p. 362. Henceforth identified as WSD.

To add to the apparent lethargy of the officers, another more objective factor was also highlighted by Beresford in his communication with Forjaz, namely the excessive age for active duty of many of the Portuguese officers.<sup>32</sup> As an example, the 4<sup>th</sup> Artillery Regiment had in 1809 and in 1812, the following age distribution per rank:<sup>33</sup>

Rank	1809	1812
Colonel	66	53
Major	67	32
Captains	63, 56, 55, 53, 52, 50, 29	55, 42, 38, 36, 32, 30, 28, 27, 24

Table 1 Age Distribution by rank

As the figures show, it is clear that a great effort was made to rejuvenate the officer ranks and to bring its age to a value more in line with active operations.

In total, and according to Challis, three hundred and eighty-seven British officers served in the Portuguese army during the Peninsular War.<sup>34</sup> For the years 1811 to 1813, the British officers were thus distributed throughout the different types of units of the Portuguese army:<sup>35</sup>

	1811	1812	1813
Line Infantry	107	122	114
Caçadores	38	42	34
Cavalry	14	10	13

Table 2 Distribution of British Officers per type of units

As for the artillery, only seven British officers were part of the Portuguese service during the war.<sup>36</sup> Although few in numbers, the British typically occupied the command positions of infantry formations. In 1813, out of the twenty-four Line regiments, fourteen were commanded by a British officer, although there were less than five British officers on average per regiment. In the Caçadores, the difference was even more striking, with eleven out of the twelve battalions led by British officers, even if there were less than three British officers on average per battalion.<sup>37</sup> The influx of British officers facilitated the adoption of British drill in the Line Infantry, Caçadores and Cavalry units, which, although necessary for a better integration of the Portuguese units with the British, was also a way of more rapidly benefit from the expertise of the British officers.<sup>38</sup> Had the British

<sup>32</sup> Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil*, Tomo V, Parte I, p.599.

<sup>33</sup> J. Botelho, *Novos Subsídios para a História da Artilharia Portuguesa*, (Lisbon, 1944), Volume I, p.156.

<sup>34</sup> L. Challis, British Officers serving in the Portuguese Army, 1809-1814, *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Vol. 27, No. 110 (Summer, 1949), pp. 50-60

<sup>35</sup> See Appendix III.

<sup>36</sup> Botelho, *História da Artilharia Portuguesa*, Volume I, pp.321-323.

<sup>37</sup> See Appendix III.

<sup>38</sup> For the translation of the British drill for line infantry, light infantry and cavalry to Portuguese, see W. Warre *Letters from the Peninsula 1808-1812*, (Lisbon, 2009) Portuguese version, p. 121,144.

drill not been adopted, the British officers would have to familiarize themselves first with the Portuguese drill before being able to start training and disciplining the Portuguese troops, requiring more time before any results would have been achieved.

With the return of Wellington to Portugal in April 1809, and his nomination as Marshal General of the Portuguese army on 29 April 1809, the trio responsible for the management of the Portuguese army was in place.<sup>39</sup> D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz, since the reestablishment of the Council of Regency, the Secretary for Naval and War Affairs, was the Portuguese mostly concerned with army matters. Although a career officer, having joined the Army in 1785, since 1801 he had joined the War Ministry in an organizational role, and hence his nomination to the Council of Regency.<sup>40</sup> As late as October 1813, after four years of war and much debate on multiple topics, Wellington had the following to say about him: 'Dom Miguel Forjaz is the ablest statesman and man of business that I have seen in the Peninsula'.<sup>41</sup> Beresford, as Commander-in-Chief of the Portuguese army, was responsible for the implementation of its reorganization, for returning discipline to the ranks and for the day-to-day management. And finally, Wellington was Commander-in-Chief of the Anglo-Portuguese forces, outranking Beresford not only in the British army but in the Portuguese army as well. The fact that these three individuals maintained their respective offices up to the end of the war, no doubt contributed to the success of the struggle with the French.

In terms of organization, the most impactful measure introduced by Wellington was the creation of the mixed infantry divisions, containing both British and Portuguese brigades, and supported either by British or Portuguese artillery batteries. Created for the first time on 18 June 1809, for the Talavera campaign, and composed solely of British troops, their establishment was increased by the Portuguese brigades on 22 February 1810, a setup that would be maintained until the end of the war. Except for the Light Division (never had a Portuguese brigade, although it had two Caçadores battalions later joined by the 17<sup>th</sup> Line Regiment), the First Division (never had any Portuguese units) and the Portuguese Division (which never had any British units), the remaining six infantry divisions followed the typical format of two British and one Portuguese brigade. To this roster must be added the Portuguese Independent brigades (unattached to any Division) and the Portuguese Cavalry brigades.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Santos, *Ordens do Dia Anno 1809* pp. 35-36.

<sup>40</sup> Fuente, *D. Miguel Pereira Forjaz*, pp.17-46.

<sup>41</sup> *WD*, Volume 11, p. 184.

<sup>42</sup> For the creation of the first British divisions, see *WSD*, Volume 6, p. 288. For the integration of Portuguese brigades in the divisions, see *ibid.* p.486.

In conclusion, and according to Glover: 'The regeneration of the Portuguese army from the slough into which it had sunk by 1808 was a very remarkable feat.'<sup>43</sup> Due to the efforts of both nations, with Great Britain taking the lion's share in terms of resources, be it weapons, accoutrements, uniforms, or money, and Portugal taking up the financial burden it could, but mostly through military units, a unique experiment in the Napoleonic Wars was successfully carried through to completion. Not only were the British and Portuguese units combined at divisional level, but there was also an integration of British officers into the Portuguese army. Although the presence of the British was particularly high from field grade officer rank and above, as was their presence in the command of Portuguese brigades or even the Portuguese Division, they represented a minuscule percentage in relation to the TO&E of all ranks (less than 0,5%). And it was not the case that the British were always in command, as it is easy to find situations where a Portuguese brigadier is commanding British Colonels which in turn command Portuguese Captains, and vice-versa.<sup>44</sup> Through it all, perhaps the most striking is the fact that it worked as well as it did, with the only recorded incident between Portuguese and British officers, that I was able to find, taking place on 3 January 1814 and resolved in a Solomonic manner by having both of the officers removed from their posts.<sup>45</sup> Although, surely, sometimes grudgingly, mutual respect and cooperation seem to have been the order of the day, as the outcome of the Peninsular War demonstrates and the following chapters will highlight.

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<sup>43</sup> M. Glover, *Wellington's Army in the Peninsula 1808-1814* (Devon,1977), p. 119.

<sup>44</sup> For an example of a Portuguese officer commanding a Division, in this case the Seventh by Lecor, see Oman, Volume 7 pp. 542-543.

<sup>45</sup> WSD, Volume 14, Appendix 2 pp. 348-349,352-353.

## Chapter 2 - Battlefield Performance of the Portuguese Combat Arms

This chapter will focus on the battlefield performance of the different arms of the Portuguese army, by which is meant the behaviour of units in battle, namely their cohesion, tactical proficiency, and ability to conduct complex operations.<sup>46</sup> As already mentioned in the introduction, the lack of contemporary Portuguese sources is a great obstacle when discussing this subject.<sup>47</sup> The closest a historian can get to the events is by using British contemporary sources, which, among other things, describe combat actions where the Portuguese units also happened to be involved. This, by itself, is a long and time-consuming task, given the number of memoirs available, and the fact that many of these only refer to the Portuguese units and actions *en passant* (if at all), with the typical focus being on their own units and on British exploits. Although contemporary accounts can, and should, be supplemented by official dispatches and other primary sources, their absence is, at times, impeditive of building a detailed picture of the events. While this approach will comprise most of the analysis, this chapter will also test the hypothesis of a normal distribution of casualties between the Portuguese and British units, particularly relevant to the infantry. This will be done with the purpose of demonstrating the battle worthiness and employment of the Portuguese infantry units in the field, through a more data driven analysis, free of some of the bias and distortions inevitable in the contemporary accounts.

The cavalry can easily be considered as the least effective of the Portuguese combat arms. If, on one hand, the Portuguese cavalry charged the French at the battle of Salamanca, on the other, the greatest black mark in the battlefield performance of any Portuguese units comes from the affair at Majalahonda.<sup>48</sup> On the afternoon of 11 August 1812, three Portuguese cavalry regiments, the 1<sup>st</sup>, 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup>, were attacked by a much larger force of French cavalry. After forming in line, the Portuguese cavalry advanced to face the Frenchmen, but on closing with them, turned around and fled, leaving the officers, which were riding in front, alone in the ranks of the enemy. After making their escape, D'Urban the officer commanding the Portuguese cavalry brigade, was able to rally the brigade in the nearby village of Las Rosas, where a light infantry battalion and a heavy cavalry brigade of the King's German Legion were stationed as supports. To no avail, did he try again to have his cavalry engage the enemy, as they refused to close with the French and fled, leaving the Germans to fend for themselves.<sup>49</sup> Not only did this lead to higher casualties of the German cavalry,

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<sup>46</sup> For an enlarged definition see E. Talmadge, *Explaining Military Effectiveness: Political Intervention and Battlefield Performance*, PhD Thesis (M.I.T., 2011) pp. 16-18.

<sup>47</sup> See Introduction.

<sup>48</sup> Muir, *Salamanca 1812*, Location 2122.

<sup>49</sup> Oman, Volume 5 pp. 509-513.

but it also caused some of the guns of MacDonald's troop of the Royal Horse Artillery to be temporarily captured by the French. As Oman writes of the incident, while the first rout can be understood due to the disparity of forces engaged, 'the second rout, in the vicinity of Las Rosas, was much more discreditable.'<sup>50</sup>

Wellington was not late in taking measures after this occurrence. Writing to Bathurst on 13 August, and after a description of the incident, the Duke effectively took the Portuguese cavalry out of the line for the duration of the Peninsular War:

The occurrences of the 22nd July had induced me to hope that the Portuguese dragoons would have conducted themselves better, or I should not have placed them at the outposts of the army. But every day's experience shows that no reliance can be placed on cavalry which is not in a perfect state of discipline, and of which the men do not feel a perfect confidence in the officers. I shall therefore not place them again at the outposts, or in situations in which by their misconduct they can influence the safety of the other troops.

I am happy to report that the officers of the Portuguese cavalry behaved remarkably well, and showed a good example to their men, particularly the Visconde de Barbacena, who was taken prisoner.<sup>51</sup>

Even considering the saving grace of the good conduct of the officers, the lack of cohesion demonstrated by the units involved made them a liability, not only to themselves but to neighbouring units. For a professional as Wellington, troops without this basic quality could not be relied upon to do their duty.

In stark contrast to the cavalry, the Portuguese artillery can be classified as splendid. Already as early as 25 August 1809, in a dispatch by Wellington to Castlereagh, it is thus described: 'The Spanish artillery are, as far as I have seen of them, entirely unexceptionable, and the Portuguese artillery excellent.'<sup>52</sup> This is also confirmed by Beresford on 21 September 1809, in a letter to Forjaz, stating that 'the Portuguese gunners are very good'.<sup>53</sup> In his work on the artillery of the Napoleonic Wars, Kiley shares the same opinion: 'The Portuguese artillery was considered as good as its British counterpart, and it filled the very large void in the artillery strength of Wellington's forces'.<sup>54</sup> Present at all the major engagements, from Buçaco to Toulouse, and at all the major sieges, the Portuguese

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid. p. 513.

<sup>51</sup> WD Volume 9, p. 350.

<sup>52</sup> WD Volume 5, p. 84.

<sup>53</sup> Soriano, *História da Guerra Civil, Segunda Epoca*, Tomo V – Parte I, p. 605.

<sup>54</sup> K. Kiley, *Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars, 1792-1815*, (London, 2004), pp. 179-180.

artillery made a name for itself.<sup>55</sup> As part of his official dispatch of the former battle, Wellington had the following praise for the gunners: ‘Major-General Picton reports the good conduct of ... the Portuguese artillery, under the command of Major Arentschildt.’ Regarding the Portuguese units at Toulouse, Lipscombe, quoting Dickson, mentions that, ‘The Portuguese artillery, ten 9 Prs. Commanded by Lieut. Colonel Arentschildt, covered the attack made by the Spaniards on the left of the enemy’s position; this artillery was warmly engaged during the best part of the day, and distinguished itself much for firmness, and correct firing.’<sup>56</sup> As an example of the employment of Portuguese gunners in sieges, Kincaid left us the following description: ‘The Portuguese artillery, under British officers, was uncommonly good. I used to be much amused in looking at a twelve-gun breaching-battery of theirs.’<sup>57</sup> As for the ability of the Anglo-Portuguese artillery brigades to conduct complex operations, Kiley makes the following comment:

‘Sir Alexander Dickson worked his way up through the Portuguese artillery to become Wellington’s artillery chief, and he had an excellent working relationship with Sir Augustus Frazer, the senior horse artillery officer. Both fitted well into Wellington’s unique command system, and the artillery worked well with the other arms in combat. As a command and control team it was a success, and probably the best of all in this category amongst the Allied armies as a whole.’<sup>58</sup>

While the artillery and cavalry played a meaningful role on the battlefield, the infantry, with its ability to conquer and hold ground, was the determining factor in deciding a battle. It is, also, the Portuguese combat arm on which opinions about its battlefield performance seem to be more divided.

John Blakiston, a captain in the 17<sup>th</sup> Line, at this stage part of the Light Division, provides a good example. Having joined the Portuguese army in April 1813, he wrote the following about the Portuguese in the battle of Vittoria on 21 June 1813: ‘Here, for the first time during the day, our regiment became exposed to a severe fire of artillery, under which, however, we deployed in a very creditable manner’.<sup>59</sup> And a couple of lines down the same page, ‘The advance of the 4<sup>th</sup> Division on our right, with their Portuguese brigade leading, was beautiful’. However, on 2 March 1814, on an

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<sup>55</sup> For a relation of Portuguese artillery brigades present at each battle and the sieges in the Peninsula, see J. Borges, *A Artilharia na Guerra Peninsular*, (Lisboa, 2009), pp. 130-138.

<sup>56</sup> N. Lipscombe, *Wellington’s Guns*, (Oxford, 2013), p.347.

<sup>57</sup> J. Kincaid, *The Rifle Brigade*, (Barnsley, 2005), p. 63.

<sup>58</sup> Kyley, *Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars*, p. 180. By Allies, Kyley is referring to all the nations that opposed Napoleon, including Austrians, Prussians, Russians, etc.

<sup>59</sup> J. Blakiston, *Twelve Years Military Adventure* (London,1829), pp.211-212.

action known as the Combat of Aire, after the repulse of an attack conducted by one of the brigades of the Portuguese Division, he wrote the following:

This failure of the Portuguese, so different from their conduct on many occasions, particularly at Bayonne, proved that however they may have improved in discipline and confidence by their connection with the British army, yet they still required the presence of British troops to inspire them with sufficient courage to withstand the tried legions of France. The Portuguese are a patient good-tempered people, therefore very susceptible of discipline under good officers; and when so are steady under arms, often presenting a more imposing appearance than our battalions, who, from possessing more impetuosity, but too often advance to the charge in a straggling order: but they are, in fact, a timid people, and to make them effective as soldiers, they should be brought into such a state of discipline that they will be more afraid of their officers than of the enemy.<sup>60</sup>

These comments from Blakiston, both on the topic of the Portuguese infantry, elicit the following observations: first, on the battle of Vittoria, his own regiment, although never engaged directly with the French, behaved well under artillery fire. He was also a witness to the 4<sup>th</sup> Division's infantry attack led by Stubb's Portuguese brigade which cleared Ariñez and considered it a most splendid assault.<sup>61</sup> From these comments, it is quite clear that the Portuguese units were able to manoeuvre and to keep up with the British units as they advanced under fire. The second comment requires a lengthier discussion, given the fact that Blakiston did not witness himself the Combat of Aire. The Light Division, on 1 March 1814 was at Mont-de-Marsan, more than thirty kilometres from Aire-sur-l'Adour, and moved the next day to somewhere between Grenade-sur-l'Adour and Cazerres-sur-l'Adour, the latter being more than ten kilometres from Aire, meaning that Blakiston could have never seen it.<sup>62</sup> Why he chose to highlight a combat that he did not witness, is somewhat puzzling. One possible interpretation is that this action was conducted by the Portuguese Division, the only major unit in Wellington's army that did not contain any British units, and Blakiston found it necessary to educate his readers on the hazards of leaving these units to themselves, without the benefit of British units propping them. It is not the existence or not of this incident that is under discussion (see Oman for a description), it is the significance that Blakiston attributes to it.<sup>63</sup> Furthermore, the fact that troops broke in battle, both the Portuguese as well as the British, mostly

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid., p.336.

<sup>61</sup> Oman Volume 6 p. 418.

<sup>62</sup> Blakiston, *Twelve Years Military Adventure*, p.333.

<sup>63</sup> Oman, Volume 7 pp. 384-385.

in offensive movements, and in lesser cases in defensive situations, was considered as an acceptable event, being more important how fast they would reform.<sup>64</sup>

A second example of the difficulty of establishing a reliable picture of the performance of the Portuguese infantry, is provided by Muir, when trying to describe the way that the British viewed the Portuguese troops:

British officers differed in their opinion of the Portuguese, who comprised one-third of the army. One stated in his memoirs that they lacked 'that esprit necessary to encounter even the French riflemen', while only the British veterans were able 'to withstand a regular attack from a French column'; but another wrote home shortly after the battle that the 'action was fought chiefly by the Portuguese and they behaved in a manner which could not be excelled'.<sup>65</sup>

The negative remark quoted above is from Lieutenant William Grattan, the same author that described the casualties from the battle of Salamanca as thus: 'The dead and the wounded on the side of the British and Portuguese (for the Spanish army, commanded by Don Carlos de España, lost *four men!*) were nearly five thousand; but the greater number of the Portuguese either fell in their feeble attempt against the Arapilles height, or by the shot that passed over the first line, composed of British, which fell at random amongst the Portuguese placed in the rear.'<sup>66</sup> In fact, out of a total of around 5,200 casualties, Pack's brigade suffered 471 casualties (in their 'feeble attempt' at the Arapilles), and the remainder of Portuguese units suffered 1,567, which, according to Grattan, were due to random shots aimed at the British.<sup>67</sup> This, to say the least, makes Grattan's tale seem highly dubious. As for the positive remark by Aitchison, given that the British suffered around sixty percent of the losses, it makes the statement that the 'action was fought chiefly by the Portuguese' also highly questionable. The examples provided are not intended to discredit the British descriptions or the importance of contemporary accounts, but instead to illustrate the difficulty of reaching a solid conclusion on battlefield performance based solely on them.

As shown above, the battlefield performance of the Portuguese infantry is a challenging topic to gauge. Given that the Portuguese perspective is missing, can the existing views be supplemented by a more factual approach? I think they can, and to that effect I will test the hypothesis of a normal distribution of casualties between the Portuguese and British units in battle, or to put it another

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<sup>64</sup> For examples of British units breaking, see Oman, Volume 6 pp. 630-633 or Muir, *Salamanca* Location 3399.

<sup>65</sup> Muir, *Salamanca*, Location 722

<sup>66</sup> W. Grattan, *Adventures with the Connaught Rangers, 1809-1814* (London, 2003) pp.256-257.

<sup>67</sup> Muir, *Salamanca*, Locations 5536 to 5538.

way, if the divisional commanders did not differentiate between the British and Portuguese brigades within their division, can we expect to see the casualties reflecting this reality? Based on the typical divisional organization, two British brigades and a Portuguese brigade, and considering that the divisions were used in the field as a coherent unit, the casualties should reflect this employment on the ground. Although there are exceptions to this divisional organization, like the case of the Light Division, or the Portuguese independent brigades, these are, in part, compensated by the First division being composed only of British troops. Also, as we are looking at ten battles, and as the order of battle changes from battle to battle, any discrepancy will tend to even out in the end. This approach, obviously, is not fireproof, nor does it pretend to be. There are hundreds of circumstances that can influence the events on the battlefield, and this complexity cannot be captured by mathematical formulas or numerical analysis alone. To quote Muir:

No figures, whether for the strength or the losses of any army in any battle, are absolutely accurate. ... These problems should deter us from regarding these statistics as being incontrovertible or above reproach; but in most cases their impact was probably slight, and the figures remain one of the most useful tools for seeking to understand what happened in the battle.<sup>68</sup>

What the analysis of the distribution of casualties will provide, at least, is a baseline against which the different battles can be analysed. That the importance of this topic was not lost on Wellington, can also be established. Writing to Cooke on 23 May 1811 on the topic of the battle of Albuera, he declared that 'Unluckily, also, the 2<sup>nd</sup> division of the army, which is Hill's, as well as the 1<sup>st</sup> (Spencer's), are composed entirely of British troops; and the 2<sup>nd</sup> division having been employed on this occasion, the loss fell solely upon the British, instead of being divided with our allies. However, I propose to alter this defective organization.'<sup>69</sup> The 'butcher's bill' falling disproportionately on British troops was clearly an issue for the Duke and reinforces the validity of this approach.

In terms of methodology, this analysis takes as a starting point the figures for British and Portuguese casualties provided by Oman in the appendices of his *History of the Peninsular War*. This is done for two main reasons: the ease of access to the information, as it is conveniently gathered and typically well presented in one place; and that these figures, have never been seriously challenged by any author. Although, as discussed in Appendix I, there are indeed issues with Oman's data, it is,

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<sup>68</sup> Muir, *Salamanca*, Location 5523

<sup>69</sup> WSD Volume 7, p. 135. The 'allies', in this context, can only refer to the Portuguese.

nevertheless, the best aggregated set of numbers on the Peninsular War. Table 3 displays the results obtained by correcting the figures from Oman:<sup>70</sup>

Battle	Date	#B.Casualties	#P.Casualties	%P.Troops A.-P. Army	%P.Casualties
Buçaco	27 September 1810	626	626	48.6%	50.0%
Fuentes d'Onoro	5 May 1811	1497	307	32.0%	17.0%
Albuera	16 May 1811	4159	389	49.4%	8.5%
Salamanca	22 July 1812	3129	2038	37.0%	39.4%
Victoria	21 June 1813	3475	1049	35.6%	23.1%
Pyrenees	28 to 30 July 1813	2092	2222	36.0%	51.5%
Nivelle	10 November 1813	2118	577	38.4%	21.4%
Nive	9 to 13 December 1813	2673	2374	36.0%	47.0%
Orthez	27 February 1814	1645	625	38.9%	27.5%
Toulouse	10 April 1814	2103	723	33.4%	25.6%

Table 3- Proportion of British and Portuguese Casualties

At Buçaco, Salamanca, Pyrenees and the Nive, that is, in four out of ten battles, the Portuguese units suffered more casualties, in proportion of the number of troops present, than the British. At Buçaco, the number of casualties were the same, and at the Pyrenees the number of Portuguese casualties surpassed the British ones. Out of these four battles, three can be considered mostly defensive affairs, with Salamanca being the only that is purely offensive, which seems to indicate that the Portuguese units were more heavily engaged on the defence than the offence.

On the other hand, the lowest number of Portuguese casualties, both relative and absolute, were suffered at Fuentes d'Oñoro and at Albuera, both defensive battles. At Fuentes, the First Division did most of the fighting, reflected by the fact that forty-six percent of the total casualties were suffered by this unit alone.<sup>71</sup> Given that it was composed solely of British battalions, this, in great part, explains the difference in relative casualties.<sup>72</sup> As for Albuera, the second most lethal battle in terms of British casualties (surpassed only by Talavera), and curiously the battle where the proportion of Portuguese units was the largest of the ten engagements, further explanation is required. The Second Division, at the time also composed solely of British battalions, alone suffered sixty-three percent of the total British and Portuguese casualties.<sup>73</sup> Half of the Second Division's casualties were caused by the destruction of Colborne's brigade by a French cavalry charge, and the other half by one of the fiercest infantry firefights of the war, which almost annihilated Hoghton's brigade. The battle was decided by the advance of Cole's Fourth Division, which, in another devastating firefight

<sup>70</sup> A full explanation of the calculations, as well as the source of the data can be found in Appendix XX.

<sup>71</sup> For the losses of the First Division, see Oman, Volume 4 pp. 622-623.

<sup>72</sup> Throughout this work, the units of the King's German Legion are considered British, although they consisted mostly of Hanoverians. For details see Oman's *Wellington's Army* pp. 220-224.

<sup>73</sup> For the losses of the Second Division, see Oman, Volume 4 pp. 631-632.

involving Myer's Fusilier brigade, routed Werle's brigade of French infantry, but at a cost of another one thousand British casualties. At Albuera, three rare events, a destruction of an infantry brigade by cavalry and two extremely deadly firefights, explain the statistical anomaly represented by this battle. Furthermore, the presence of Spanish troops and their role in the battle, also illustrates how circumstantial battles were in terms of which units were heavily engaged or not once the shooting started. Despite their relatively small role, the Portuguese units were still able to show their tactical proficiency at both the engagements. At Fuentes, the Portuguese formed part of the celebrated advance by the Light Division to cover the retreat to the army lines of the Seventh Division. At Albuera, Portuguese troops were part of the Fourth Division attack on Werle's brigade, and part of the repulse of a French cavalry attack while deployed in line by Harvey's brigade.<sup>74</sup> Nevertheless, and as already alluded to, Wellington was not pleased with the casualty distribution, and a Portuguese brigade was added to the Second Division after Albuera, and such a discrepancy in casualties was not to occur again. Another element may have also been in play at both battles, but particularly at Fuentes. While at Buçaco, the natural strength of the position made it easily defensible even by inexperienced troops, the same terrain factor was not present at Fuentes or Albuera. Wellington and Beresford might have been reluctant to employ untried troops, as most of the Portuguese units were in May 1811. According to Muir, 'it took three years to make infantry completely disciplined'.<sup>75</sup>

Regarding the battle of the Pyrenees, the only battle in which the Portuguese casualties topped those of the British, it was an action that lasted two days, with First Sorrauren fought on 28 July 1813 and Second Sorrauren and Beunza fought on 30 July. In terms of tactical proficiency, the combat at Beunza is worthy of mention. Comprised of Da Costa's brigade of the Portuguese Division, and Ashworth's brigade of the Second Division, plus two understrength British brigades, totalling, according to Oman, around 8,000 men, this force held off 18,000 Frenchmen. Although forced to retire from their initial position due to the British giving way on their left, a fighting withdrawal was successfully conducted to a second position, from which the French were unable to make any further advance.<sup>76</sup> A force consisting of around two thirds of Portuguese, which took almost eighty percent of the casualties, held off a French contingent more than twice their size, and conducted one of the most difficult tactical manoeuvres, a withdrawal in contact with the enemy. Although considered a tactical defeat, this action is a fine example of the battlefield proficiency achieved by

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<sup>74</sup> For the celebrated manoeuvre by the Light Division at Fuentes, see Oman, Volume 4 pp. 324-329. For the repulse of the French cavalry while deployed in line, see *ibid.* pp. 390-391.

<sup>75</sup> R. Muir, *Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon*, (New Haven, 2000) p.75.

<sup>76</sup> For a full description of the fight at Beunza and the figures used in the calculations, see Oman, Volume 6, pp. 703-704.

Portuguese forces when defending. Concerning this battle, and emphasizing the importance attributed to the ratio of casualties, Bathurst wrote to Wellington on 20 October 1813:

While His Royal Highness deeply regrets the great proportionate loss which the Portuguese troops suffered on this and other recent occasions, His Royal Highness cannot but consider it as a proof that the zeal and ardour which have from the outset distinguished them are unabated, and will continue to exalt the military glory of their country.<sup>77</sup>

In terms of clear-cut offensive actions by Portuguese units, although rarer than defensive ones, the battle of Vittoria is a good example. The attack led by both the Portuguese brigades of the Third and Fourth divisions, respectively Power's and Stubb's brigades, helped shatter the French line at Ariñez.<sup>78</sup> This advance was performed against a defensive line, supported by the greatest French artillery concentration of the Peninsular War. As remarked by Wellington in his official dispatch of 22 June 1813, 'The troops advanced in echelons of regiments in two, and occasionally three lines; and the Portuguese troops in the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4th divisions, under the command of Brigadier General Power and Colonel Stubbs, led the march with steadiness and gallantry never surpassed on any occasion'.<sup>79</sup> This is also demonstrated by the brigades' casualties. In the Fourth Division, Stubb's brigade suffered two thirds of all the casualties of the division, while Power's brigade in the Third suffered close to thirty percent.<sup>80</sup> Due to their conduct at Vittoria, the units composing both brigades were the single Portuguese units during the war to be distinguished with a special recognition by the Portuguese Prince Regent. Returning to Talmadge, this infantry action illustrates the whole spectrum of activities that units have to be able to perform on the battlefield: unit cohesion under fire, demonstrated by the units being under artillery fire and advancing against infantry; basic tactics, in this case the use of line formation in the advance; and finally, complex operations, as these units were part of larger units (brigades and divisions) which were cooperating in an assault.

To finalize the discussion on the infantry, and returning to Muir, 'In the battle the Portuguese proved to be good troops, and only gave way in circumstances where British troops might also have been broken. In general they were almost, but not quite, as reliable as the British, and took their fair share of the fighting.'<sup>81</sup> Although Muir is addressing only the battle of Salamanca, this description may be applied to the conduct of the Portuguese infantry in the Peninsula, from Buçaco up to Toulouse. Through their conduct in the field, tactical prowess both in offence and defence was repeatedly

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<sup>77</sup> WSD Volume 8, p. 318.

<sup>78</sup> Oman, Volume 6, pp. 420-421. See also comment by Blakiston p. XXX

<sup>79</sup> WD Volume 10, pp. 450-451.

<sup>80</sup> For casualties, see Oman, Volume 6, pp. 758-760.

<sup>81</sup> Muir, *Salamanca 1812*, Location 722. See page XXX of this dissertation.

demonstrated by the Portuguese infantry. Though lacking episodes of extreme gallantry like the firefights at Albuera, which were also not the rule for British units, and which may have happened at a smaller scale but are not documented, unit cohesion is also amply proven. This is also reinforced by the absence of major detrimental episodes, such as surrenders or desertions of large units in the face of the enemy or mass routs in battle. And finally, the capability to undertake complex operations, though relying on a British command superstructure, is a given, otherwise the Portuguese units would not have been able to be combined with the British ones. The proportion of Portuguese to British losses, which, as a total of the ten battles, is a third of the Anglo-Portuguese casualties, is remarkably close to the average percentage of around thirty-seven percent of Portuguese troops in battle.<sup>82</sup> This demonstrates that the Portuguese infantry units were used interchangeably with the British, and that the variations in casualties per battle are mostly due to circumstances and not to any major difference in the handling of units from different nationalities. To put it in another way, as their employment in the field confirms, the Portuguese infantry units may be considered as good as the average British unit.

As an overall conclusion to the chapter, and apart from the cavalry, relegated to second line duties after Majalahonda, the Portuguese infantry and artillery were highly effective components of Wellington's army and clearly contributed, on a tactical level, to make the Anglo-Portuguese army unbeatable on the Peninsular battlefields.

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<sup>82</sup> See Appendix I

## Chapter 3: Operational Relevance of the Portuguese Army

This chapter will assess the operational relevance of the Portuguese units in two distinct phases of the Peninsular War. The first period, from Wellington's return to the Peninsula up to the end of Masséna's invasion of Portugal, will analyse the significance that Wellington himself attributed to the Portuguese units, and his efforts to put an effective army in the field before the start of the French invasion. This analysis, taken together with the Duke's plan for the defence of Portugal, will highlight the key role played by the Portuguese units in this period. The analysis of the second period, from the eviction of Masséna from Portugal until the end of the war, will also show the continuing operational relevance of the Portuguese army. Due to different reasons, from British manpower shortages to Wellington's political issues with the Spanish, and as underlined by a numerical analysis, the Portuguese units kept their significance until the end of the war.

As already mentioned in the introduction, Wellington was, from an early date, fully vocal on the potential relevance of a reorganised Portuguese army for the conduct of the campaign in the Peninsula.<sup>83</sup> In line with the Duke's 'Memorandum for the Defence of Portugal' from 7 March 1809, the instructions from the Government, which accompany his appointment to the command of His Majesty's forces in Portugal in 2 April 1809, clearly state as a second priority that Wellington should: 'direct your utmost exertions to the bringing forward the Portuguese army, and rendering it capable of co-operating with His Majesty's troops.'<sup>84</sup> However, by the date of his return to Portugal, more urgent matters required his attention. The occupation of Oporto by Marshal Soult on 29 March 1809 and a possible threat from Marshal Victor from the Estremadura region of Spain, made the military situation in Portugal very precarious.<sup>85</sup> With the British seriously contemplating an evacuation of the remaining troops and an abandonment of Portugal to the French, immediate action was required if the country was to be kept as a basis of operations.<sup>86</sup> Having landed on 22 April, the Duke did not lose any time. As his dispatch on the 27 April to Castlereagh shows, Wellington resolved to take the offensive, and taking advantage of his central position, decided to strike each of his opponents in quick succession.<sup>87</sup> First, he would strike Soult to the northward, with the support of such Portuguese troops that were able to take the field. Then, with Spanish support from General Cuesta, he would look to Victor's troops in Estremadura. By 12 May the Douro river had been successfully crossed, Oporto was back in Allied hands, and Soult was in retreat to Galicia. Writing to Castlereagh

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<sup>83</sup> See introduction.

<sup>84</sup> WSD Volume 6, p. 210.

<sup>85</sup> Oman, Volume 2, pp.287-292.

<sup>86</sup> WSD Volume 6, pp. 222-223

<sup>87</sup> WD Volume 4, pp. 272-273.

on 20 May 1809, the Duke reports that the pursuit of Soult was being called off, and that the troops were being moved south with the intention of blocking any possible French advance from Estremadura.<sup>88</sup> Although the Talavera campaign and the ensuing retreat to Portugal were mostly a British and Spanish affair, and therefore outside of the scope of this work, it served to demonstrate that the notion, that a British army supported by Spanish forces, would be able to drive the French from Spain, was incorrect.<sup>89</sup> A new operational approach was required, made more urgent by the fact that the Austrians were defeated at Wagram on 5 and 6 July, sealing the fate of the War of the Fifth Coalition in favour of Napoleon, an event that would free further French troops to the Peninsula. Moreover, forty thousand British troops had landed in the Scheldt estuary, in what is best described as 'a disastrous attempt at an amphibious invasion of the Low Countries'.<sup>90</sup>

The new operational approach is made clear by Wellington in a dispatch from 19 August to Beresford, written on the eve of the start of the retreat to the Portuguese frontier:

I think we owe this to Government, at an early period, in order to enable them to determine how far they will go in expense, and how much they will risk in an army to maintain Portugal in the existing situation of the world. A great deal has been done, and Government may be supposed to have acted rightly in sending their troops when they did, and in saving Portugal when the French were involved in the Austrian contest. But the question becomes one of a different description, that contest being finished; and I think that Government will be assisted in their decision very much by the prospect which you may be able to hold out of the existence of a Portuguese military force.<sup>91</sup>

Given the need for a defensive posture, focused on maintaining a foothold in Portugal, the topic of the Portuguese army as a viable fighting force was brought back to the forefront of events. Beresford, with his privileged status as Commander of the Portuguese army, was the person best placed to provide an opinion of the potential of the Portuguese army. This change in approach is demonstrated by Wellington's dispatch to Castlereagh on 25 August 1809. According to the Duke, 'The information which I have acquired in the last two months has opened my eyes respecting the state of the war in the Peninsula.'<sup>92</sup> He went to great lengths to demonstrate the weaknesses of the Spanish units, stating that 'It is impossible to calculate upon any operation with these troops.' Wellington went so far as to say 'and I strongly recommend to you, unless you mean to incur the risk

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<sup>88</sup> Ibid., pp. 347-348.

<sup>89</sup> M. Glover, *Wellington as a Military Commander* (London, 2001), p. 72.

<sup>90</sup> Esdaile, *Peninsular War*, p. 320.

<sup>91</sup> WD Volume 5, pp. 55-57.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., pp. 82-83.

of the loss of your army, not to have any thing to do with Spanish warfare on any ground whatever, in the existing state of things'.<sup>93</sup> Following this harsh appraisal of the Spanish forces, Wellington presented as the only viable option, in a return to his views reflected on the Memorandum on the defence of Portugal, that:

The next point in this subject is, supposing the Portuguese army to be rendered efficient, what can be done with it and Portugal, if the French should obtain possession of the remainder of the Peninsula? My opinion is, that we ought to be able to hold Portugal, if the Portuguese army and militia are complete.<sup>94</sup>

Armed with Beresford's report on the prospects of the Portuguese army, Wellington writes to Castlereagh on 29 September, 'The dispatch from Marshal Beresford of the 26th instant, which I forward by this occasion, will show your Lordship how important it is that the Portuguese troops should be kept in tranquillity for some time.'<sup>95</sup> Reinforced with the knowledge that the Portuguese army, although requiring more time, was improving, Wellington proceeded with his plan for the construction of a defensive line. To that effect, he issued a memorandum on 20 October to Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher of the Royal Engineers, with instructions to build a number of fortifications around the city of Lisbon, commonly known as the Lines of Torres Vedras.<sup>96</sup>

The topic of the defence of Portugal and the Portuguese army was approached again in Wellington's dispatch to Lord Liverpool on 14 November 1809.<sup>97</sup> Following a change of Cabinet, the new Government requested an appraisal of the situation from the Commander in Chief of his forces in the Peninsula.<sup>98</sup> From the proposition that, considering the present military situation, the French would not be able to evict the British from Portugal, Wellington then predicted, given the peace treaty in Austria, a rise in the number of French troops in the Peninsula. To face this increase, which could be expected to be directed at an invasion of Portugal, the existing forces were not sufficient, and, apart from increasing British strength to 30,000 effective troops, the Portuguese must be made battle ready.<sup>99</sup> Although already undergoing a reorganisation, and further underlining the importance of the Portuguese army, the Duke asked for an increase in the subsidy, to speed up and consolidate this restructuring. Of note, is the fact that Wellington considered that Portugal, if

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid., pp. 85-90.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., p. 89.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., p. 198.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., pp. 230-235. For a full description of the Lines, see Oman, Volume 3, pp. 422-429.

<sup>97</sup> Liverpool replaces Castlereagh Oman, Volume 3, p. 168.

<sup>98</sup> WSD Volume 6, pp. 412-413.

<sup>99</sup> Wellington further stresses the point that a French surge will be directed to an invasion of Portugal, in another dispatch from the same day to Liverpool. See WD Volume 5, p. 275.

abandoned by the British, would probably surrender, which clearly highlights the mutual dependency of the British and Portuguese. Finally, and as a last resort, preparations were already ongoing for an embarkation of the British army. Wellington ended the dispatch by re-stating the relevance of the Portuguese army in the upcoming events:

Although I consider the Portuguese Government and army as the principals in the contest for their own independence, and that the success or failure must depend principally upon their own exertions, and the bravery of their army, (and I am sanguine in my expectations of both from them, when excited by the example of British officers and troops), I have no hope of either, if his Majesty should now withdraw his army from the Peninsula.<sup>100</sup>

Not only through words but also through deeds, considering that Wellington used his position as Commander in Chief to influence the Government in pledging more resources in the support of an ally, the significance to the Duke of the Portuguese army in the upcoming struggle is clear. The British Government did not give in easily to an increase of over sixty percent of the subsidy, however. The Duke addressed this topic twice more in the month of December. On the 19<sup>th</sup> he wrote to Liverpool, 'But if Great Britain cannot afford this expense, and if the arms, clothing, and equipments required cannot be sent to Portugal, at least as soon as the enemy can send into the Peninsula the reinforcements to his armies, the contest must be carried on with manifest disadvantage.'<sup>101</sup> He reinforced the message on the 28<sup>th</sup> by stating again to Liverpool, 'His Majesty's Government must be the best judges whether it is proper to continue the war in the Peninsula; and whether the best mode of opposing the enemy in the Peninsula is by an exertion to create a military force in Portugal.'<sup>102</sup> This importance is further illustrated by his communication to Villiers on 14 January 1810, addressing, amongst other topics, the deteriorating military situation in Spain, brought about by the destruction of two Spanish armies:<sup>103</sup>

Circumstances have certainly altered materially since that letter was written; but the question for me is, have they altered in such a manner as to induce me to think that with 30,000 men, which I have reason to believe I shall have in the course of a few weeks (together with the Portuguese army, which, by the bye, is better than I ever expected it would be, and wants only to be equipped as it ought), I shall not be able to save Portugal, or, at all events, to sell the country dearly?...

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<sup>100</sup> WD Volume 5, p. 273.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., p. 367.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., p. 386. The increase in subsidy would be accepted by the Government as per Liverpool's dispatch of 15 December 1809 found at WSD Volume 6, p. 451.

<sup>103</sup> For the battles of Ocaña and Alba de Tormes see Esdaile, *Peninsular War*, pp. 216-217.

I think that if the Portuguese do their duty, I shall have enough to maintain it; if they do not, nothing that Great Britain can afford can save the country; and if from that cause I fail in saving it, and am obliged to go, I shall be able to carry away the British army.<sup>104</sup>

The anticipated disparity in the number of British and French forces would be so great, and with Great Britain unable to match it, that either the Portuguese would fight, or defeat and embarkation were the inevitable outcomes. The dependency on the Portuguese army is also recognised by the Government, as stated by Liverpool on his dispatch of 2 August 1810 to Wellington:

The issue of the contest, we are well aware, must depend upon two considerations: the magnitude of the effort which the French can make against Portugal, and the reliance which can be placed on the Portuguese troops when they come in contact with the enemy.

The last can be known only by experience. On the single occasion on which there has been hitherto an opportunity of trying them, they appear to have acquitted themselves with credit.<sup>105</sup>

With Ciudad Rodrigo already taken, and the invasion of Portugal led by Masséna in progress, the Duke could not look forward to British reinforcements to face the French onslaught. Following the fall of Almeida on 27 August, and subsequent retreat of the Anglo-Portuguese army in the direction of the Lines, the French accepted Wellington's challenge and decided to attack the Buçaco ridge. This literal 'trial by fire' of the Portuguese troops, elicited the following remarks from the Duke in his official dispatch to Lord Liverpool:

... it has brought the Portuguese levies into action with the enemy for the first time in an advantageous situation; and they have proved that the trouble which has been taken with them has not been thrown away, and that they are worthy of contending in the same ranks with British troops in this interesting cause, which they afford the best hopes of saving.<sup>106</sup>

Although the battle of Buçaco did not mark the end of the French invasion, it had, nevertheless, a significant impact on the campaign, far beyond its immediate military consequence. Wellington's plan, according to Esdaile 'one of the most perfect schemes of defence that has ever been devised', consisted of several elements.<sup>107</sup> First, it recognized that until Lisbon fell, Portugal would not submit to the French. Lisbon was not only the capital city; it was the main point of entry of supplies into the country, as well as the chosen location for the evacuation of the British army. The second element,

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<sup>104</sup> WD Volume 5, p. 413.

<sup>105</sup> WSD Volume 6, p. 568. Liverpool is referring to the Combat of the Coa on 24 July 1810.

<sup>106</sup> WD Volume 6, p. 449.

<sup>107</sup> Esdaile, *Peninsular War*, p. 312.

what would be called today a 'scorched earth' policy, consisted in evacuating populations, and removing or destroying supplies and means of transport in the path of the French.<sup>108</sup> The third aspect, as previously described, were the Lines of Torres Vedras, arranged for the protection of Lisbon. The Lines, however, were not to be manned by the regular army but mostly by militia units, leaving the Anglo-Portuguese field army free to manoeuvre and to counterattack any French penetration.<sup>109</sup> The last element, was the use of the militia to garrison other important fortresses of the country, such as Abrantes and Elvas, to watch the frontiers in the north and south of Portugal, and in general to be a nuisance to the French army, attacking isolated forces and severing communications with Spain.<sup>110</sup> The whole plan, then, depended on the Portuguese army and its battle readiness. Scorched earth, by itself, would not halt the French army, being only meaningful if the French were forced to stop for a significant amount of time in front of a position - this was the role of the Lines. It is in this regard that the battle of Buçaco gains a distinct importance, given that the battle worthiness displayed by the Portuguese army enabled this approach to play out. Had there been a Portuguese fiasco, of the kind witnessed by Wellington at Talavera by Spanish troops behaving in 'this practice of running away, and throwing off arms, accoutrements, and clothing, is fatal to every thing, excepting a re-assembly of the men in a state of nature', it can be argued that the Duke would have no choice but to embark the British army.<sup>111</sup> Had the regular units bolted, better could have not been expected from the militias manning the Line, which the Duke considered, as second line troops.<sup>112</sup> Even the scenario of crewing the Lines with British troops, given the difference in numbers of 50,000 French to 34,000 British, seems far-fetched, considering that Wellington's orders were to not risk the British army in a desperate struggle, but, should it come to that extremity, to embark it on the transports kept waiting at the Tagus for that purpose.<sup>113</sup> Following Buçaco, the French followed the Anglo-Portuguese army to the Lines where, dismayed by their existence, were deterred from attacking. Although taking longer than Wellington predicted, the remorseless logic of the 'scorched earth' kicked in and the French were forced to retreat to Spain.

The numbers bear out this analysis. By the time of the French arrival in front of the Lines, the total number of Portuguese troops can be conservatively estimated at 70,000, with the following distribution: inside the Lines, 12,000 Militia and Militia Artillery, plus 27,000 Line troops, around 40,000 troops in total. Outside the Lines, another 30,000 Militia brings the total size of the

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<sup>108</sup> WD Volume 5, p. 231.

<sup>109</sup> Esdaile, *Peninsular War*, p. 312.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 319.

<sup>111</sup> WD Volume 5, p. 85.

<sup>112</sup> WD Volume 6, p. 554.

<sup>113</sup> C. Hall, *Wellington's Navy Sea Power and the Peninsular War, 1807-1814* (London, 2004), pp. 96-97.

Portuguese army to 70,000. If we consider that inside the Lines were approximately 35,000 British troops, the latter, at the most, represent a third of the Anglo-Portuguese forces in Portugal.<sup>114</sup> An examination of the battle of Buçaco reaches the same conclusions. In this battle, the Portuguese units amounted to forty eight percent of Wellington's army, roughly half of a force totalling 52,000 men, which faced an army of slightly more than 62,000 Frenchmen.<sup>115</sup> If the number of Portuguese are subtracted, this leaves around 27,000 British facing 62,000 French, odds of more than two to one. The Duke being averse to risk-taking with his army, this makes it very unlikely that the battle would have been fought at all.

Both the qualitative and the quantitative analysis clearly demonstrate that the Portuguese army was a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for the defeat of the French in any attempt to reconquer Portugal and drive the British from the Peninsula. On the other hand, the Portuguese army cannot be considered sufficient for the defence of Portugal, for two reasons: first, a large percentage of the army was composed of militia, second line troops that, without the benefit of fortifications, were not sufficiently trained to stand in a line of battle. Second, the Portuguese army lacked battlefield experience, most of its units never having faced the French in combat. Besides, the regular army amounted to around 35,000 men, giving it a numerical inferiority when compared to the French. It can be concluded that neither army, by itself, was sufficiently strong to face the French. In other words, Wellington's plan was totally dependent on the existence of an effective Portuguese army, which, together with the British units, would even the odds against the French.

The operational relevance of the Portuguese army does not come to an end with the retreat of Masséna's army from Portugal in the end of March 1811. As the war progressed, and the theatre of operations moved from Portugal to Spain and then to France, several factors contributed to a continuing significance of the Portuguese troops. Chief amongst these were the manpower constraints of the British army and the difficult political relationship between Wellington and the Spanish government. Regarding the former, and as mentioned by Oman, 'the increase of the total number of the battalions at the front was not so great as might have been expected', considering that from March 1811 to March 1814 there was only a gain of seven battalions.<sup>116</sup> This relatively small increase was a direct consequence of the method of recruitment of the British army which relied on voluntary recruitment rather than on conscription. To complicate matters even further, recruitment was not centralised, but controlled and run by regiments, which hampered the ability of

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<sup>114</sup> The figures presented in Oman, Volume 3, pp. 556-557 underrepresent the Portuguese units by four thousand men. Details are provided in Appendix II.

<sup>115</sup> Oman Volume 3, p.543

<sup>116</sup> Oman *Wellington's Army*, p. 173.

the Duke of York 'to manage and distribute manpower effectively'.<sup>117</sup> As Knight points out, throughout the twelve years of the Napoleonic Wars (from 1803 to 1815) 'the regular army had never managed to recruit as many soldiers as it had lost through death, discharge or desertion', the shortfall being made up by transferring soldiers from the militia to the regular army.<sup>118</sup> The militia as a source of manpower, however, was also being depleted, so much so that 'By 1812 so many men had transferred to the regular army that the deficiency of the militia establishment was as high as 30 per cent.'<sup>119</sup> This leads Knight to conclude that 'By 1813 Britain was operating very close to the limits of its manpower with what was effectively a volunteer army.'<sup>120</sup> In terms of the Peninsular War, this is evidenced by Wellington introducing a new type of formation in the British army, namely the Provisional Battalions, which were composite units made up of a consolidation of two weak battalions into a stronger one.<sup>121</sup> Not only were the manpower sources declining, but Great Britain's military commitments were increasing. The start of the War of 1812 put further stress on the number of troops needed for other theatres, as did the need for units to garrison the Baltic ports and for the subsequent expedition to Holland.<sup>122</sup> Although a detailed discussion is outside of the scope of this dissertation, it is an important factor that, given the dynamic strategic environment, Wellington's British forces in the Peninsula marginally declined during the last months of the conflict.<sup>123</sup>

As for the Duke's, and Great Britain's, relationship with Spain, it can best be summarised as a tumultuous cooperation. The Spanish government, always suspicious of British intentions, never accepted the same type of military force integration as the Portuguese. Their units typically formed a distinct corps, composed only of Spanish troops, and handled in the battlefield as a separate division. Until Wellington's nomination as a Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish armies, he held no formal command over the Spanish armies, relying on his powers of persuasion over the Spanish commanders to be able to include their forces in military operations. This haphazard arrangement produced uneven results, as demonstrated by the Talavera campaign or the events preceding the battle of Salamanca, while on the other hand, the battle of Albuera showed the value of the Spanish

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<sup>117</sup> Knight, R. *Britain against Napoleon – The Organization of Victory 1793-1815*, Location 7647.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, Location 7647.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, Location 7715.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, Location 7715.

<sup>121</sup> Bamford, A. "Injurious to The Service Generally": Finding Manpower for Northern Europe, 1813 & 1814, *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Vol. 90, No. 361 (Spring 2012), p. 28. See also WD Volume 10, pp. 628-629.

<sup>122</sup> Bamford, "Injurious to The Service", p. 28.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

army.<sup>124</sup> The situation did not stabilise even with the Duke's appointment as commander of the Spanish armies. This is demonstrated by his resignation, or more precisely his attempt at it, in July 1813. Add to this that, due to widespread pillaging, Wellington ordered most of the Spanish troops to retreat from France back into Spain in November 1813, and a picture emerges of uncertainty in the reliability of the Spanish forces.<sup>125</sup> This is accentuated by the fact that the Spanish forces were not a constant presence in the battles involving the Anglo-Portuguese army in Spain and France, playing no part at Fuentes d'Onoro, Salamanca, Nive and Orthez, that is, in four out of nine battles.

The figures substantiate this analysis. As Table 4 below shows, after 1810 the Portuguese units comprised between one third and one half of the total number of troops in the Anglo-Portuguese army in the battles of the Peninsular War, clearly demonstrating their continued operational importance. At Fuentes d'Onoro, a defensive battle, Wellington's army of 37,000 troops faced 48,000 thousand French.<sup>126</sup> If the Portuguese units are subtracted, this would leave 25,000 British facing odds of close to two to one. At Salamanca, an offensive battle, the Anglo-Portuguese, numbering 48,000 plus 3,000 Spanish, attacked 49,000 French.<sup>127</sup> If we subtract the Portuguese, this would leave 33,000 British and Spanish attacking 49,000 French.

Battle	Date	#B.Troops	#P.Troops	%P.Troops A.-P. Army
Buçaco	27 September 1810	26843	25429	48.65%
Fuentes d'Onoro	5 May 1811	25474	12030	32.08%
Albuera	16 May 1811	10449	10201	49.40%
Salamanca	22 July 1812	30562	18017	37.09%
Victoria	21 June 1813	47612	26317	35.60%
Pyrenees	28 to 30 July 1813	N/A	N/A	N/A
Nivelle	10 November 1813	38892	24240	38.40%
Nive	9 to 13 December 1813	N/A	N/A	N/A
Orthez	27 February 1814	27098	17304	38.97%
Toulouse	10 April 1814	26186	13012	33.20%

Table 4 Percentage Portuguese troops

As a conclusion to this chapter, it may be argued that, starting at the battle of Buçaco, the Portuguese units gained an operational importance that was maintained until the end of the war. Although, from the moment that the conflict moved outside of Portugal, the Portuguese troops never again represented two thirds of the Anglo-Portuguese forces, explained by the fact that the Portuguese militia was no longer a factor in the military operations, the first line units preserved a

<sup>124</sup> For the Talavera campaign see Esdaile, *Peninsular War*, pp. 192-193. For Salamanca *ibid.* 393-394. For Albuera, see *ibid.* 342-343.

<sup>125</sup> WD Volume 11, pp. 277-278 and *ibid.* p.304. Wellington ordered the Spanish back across the frontier to avoid antagonising further the French population.

<sup>126</sup> Oman, Volume 4, pp.618-628.

<sup>127</sup> Oman, Volume 5, pp.595-603.

percentage consistently above one third of Wellington's force in battle. The manpower constraints starting to affect the British and, principally, the difficult military and political relationship with Spain, explain why this relevance was kept.

## Conclusion

The preceding pages have presented one overarching *leitmotiv*: that the Portuguese army, as a fighting force, has been systematically underrepresented in the historiography of the Peninsular War. To settle this matter, two main points needed to be addressed. On one hand, if the Portuguese army was battleworthy, and on the other hand, if this army was operationally relevant. A Portuguese army not fit for battle, given that it could not be trusted on the battlefield, would imply an irrelevant army from an operational perspective. A battleworthy army, but not operationally relevant, would mean that this army, due to other factors such as the existence of better and more numerous troops, was not required to beat the enemy. Although Esdaile in his *History of the Peninsular War* does a fair job of representing the operational relevance of the different Allied armies in the Peninsula, his analysis does not extend to battlefield performance of the Portuguese units. Furthermore, he does not present data in an aggregated format on the different battles, allowing the reader to take his conclusions and to look at the overall picture.

While the first chapter did not address any of these topics directly, it described how, from the inauspicious start of 1808, the Portuguese army evolved to become an effective fighting force by the battle of Buçaco. Three main factors were considered: first, the composition of the Portuguese army, mostly in place before the arrival of Beresford to take command of the Portuguese forces, and its major differences in structure to the British units. Second, the way that this structure was implemented with the support of British officers, which, as demonstrated by Beresford's and Wellington's diagnosis, was considered a key aspect for a rapid reestablishment of the Portuguese army. The relevance of the British officers was evaluated by a detailed analysis of their numbers per main unit type, having demonstrated that, while occupying numerous leadership roles, their overall numbers were small. Finally, and perhaps the most important organizational aspect, the way the Portuguese brigades were integrated into a single force, the Anglo-Portuguese army, a brainchild of Wellington. As the lack of documented evidence seems to show, this unique 'double integration', simultaneously of British officers in the Portuguese service, and of Portuguese brigades in mixed Anglo-Portuguese divisions, worked remarkably well, proven by the fact that it suffered only minor adjustments from its introduction in 1810 until the end of the war.

The second chapter evaluated how the Portuguese army, following its reorganization, behaved on the battlefield. To that effect, each Portuguese combat arm was separately analysed, and the following conclusions arrived at: the cavalry, tainted by the affair at Majalahonda, was, from that date, relegated to second line missions. The artillery, on the other hand, was deemed as excellent throughout the conflict and fought well in the battles and sieges of the Peninsula. Had this not been

the case, it is hard to fathom that Dickson, a British officer in the Portuguese artillery, would rise to be Wellington's overall commander of this arm in the Peninsula. As for the infantry, the most important arm on the battlefield, the sources are more divided in their evaluation. To try to overcome this discrepancy, a numerical analysis of casualties was conducted for the ten battles in which the Anglo-Portuguese army participated. Ten battles can be considered a good sample and is the first analysis of this type and with such wide scope, that I am aware of.<sup>128</sup> This assessment not only highlighted the battles in which the Portuguese had proportionally more casualties than the British, four out of ten, it also showed that, overall, the proportion of total Portuguese battle casualties are remarkably close to the average percentage of Portuguese troops in the field. These findings, when combined with sources and historiography, demonstrated that the Portuguese infantry was an effective arm on the battlefield, as good as the average British unit.

The last chapter assessed the operational relevance of the Portuguese units in two distinct periods. The first covered Masséna's invasion of Portugal, analysing Wellington's plan of defence and considering the role played by the Portuguese army in it. It also looked at the significance that Wellington himself attributed to the Portuguese units, and his efforts in trying to have an effective army in the field before the start of the French invasion. A quantitative look at the Anglo-Portuguese forces arrayed to receive the French, confirmed the importance of the Portuguese. By the time the Anglo-Portuguese army marched behind the Lines of Torres Vedras, the Portuguese were two thirds of the military forces in Portugal. Without them as an effective fighting force, 'the tide of French conquest' would not have been stopped.<sup>129</sup> The analysis of the second period, from the eviction of Masséna from Portugal until the end of the war, also showed the continuing operational relevance of the Portuguese army. Due to different reasons, from British manpower shortages to Wellington's political issues with the Spanish, and as underlined again by a numerical analysis of the ten battles, the Portuguese units kept their operational relevance until the end of the war.

Wellington, the first to have raised the potential importance of a Portuguese military contribution, and the man best placed throughout the whole conflict to judge it, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Anglo-Portuguese army, deserves the last word. Writing to Castlereagh on 12 April 1815, nearly one year after the end of the Peninsular War and with a new war with France in sight, the Duke had not forgotten his Portuguese troops. In a situation that clearly proves his opinion of the quality of the Portuguese troops, why would he take the trouble to bring them from Portugal if otherwise, Wellington had the following to say, 'There is likewise this advantage in Portuguese troops, viz. that

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<sup>128</sup> For the only other similar analysis, and just for the battle of Salamanca, see Muir, *Salamanca*.

<sup>129</sup> Oman, Volume 4, p. iii.

we can mix them with ours and do what we please with them, and they become very nearly as good as our own.<sup>130</sup>

#### Future Research

The 'other side of the hill', that is, the French view on the Portuguese army they faced in the Peninsula. For reasons of time and word-count, this topic is not addressed in this dissertation.

A second topic is obviously related to the data issues encountered with Oman's figures on Portuguese battle casualties. As discussed at length in Appendix I, the discrepancies found, although corrected to the best of my knowledge, require validation at the National Archives in Kew. For obvious public health reasons, this validation is not possible now, but it is a clear priority for anyone studying the Portuguese army. In a way, the discrepancies encountered in this dissertation, both in battle casualties, and in the number of Portuguese troops behind the Lines of Torres Vedras, as discussed in Appendix II, clearly represent the little work that has been done, so far, on the Portuguese army.

The last topic for further research, would be the integration of the Portuguese units into mixed infantry divisions. As mentioned in the dissertation, there is only one communication from Beresford to Wellington discussing this integration and its rationale. Not only a letter from Wellington to Beresford should exist, but I am convinced that further communications should exist on this topic. Why Wellington went from individual battalions (splitting Line Regiments) in 1809, to Brigades in 1810 is a topic that I have not seen addressed by any author. Public health reasons have also hindered further research on this topic.

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<sup>130</sup> WD, Volume 12, pp. 311-312.

## Appendices

## Appendix I

In terms of methodology, this analysis takes as a starting point the figures for British and Portuguese casualties provided by Oman in the appendices of his *History of the Peninsular War*. This is done for two main reasons: one being the ease of access to the information, as it is conveniently gathered and typically well presented in one place; and the second being that these figures, as far as I can ascertain, have never been seriously challenged by any author. Although, as is discussed below, there are indeed issues with Oman's data, it is, nevertheless, the best aggregated set of numbers on the Peninsular War. The table below displays the results obtained as per the figures from Oman:

Battle	Date	#B.Troops	#P.Troops	%P.Troops	%P.Casualties	%B.Killed	%P.Killed	#B.Casualties	#P.Casualties
Buçaco	27 September 1810	28843	25429	46.85%	50.00%	16.61%	15.51%	626	626
Fuentes d'Onoro	5 May 1811	25474	12030	32.08%	17.00%	11.82%	20.84%	1497	307
Albuera	16 May 1811	10449	10201	49.40%	8.50%	21.20%	26.22%	4159	389
Salamanca	22 July 1812	30562	18017	37.09%	34.00%	12.40%	31.10%	3129	1627
Vittoria	21 June 1813	47612	26317	35.60%	21.00%	14.93%	27.56%	3475	921
Pyrenees	28 to 30 July 1813	N/A	N/A	N/A	45.29%	13.86%	29.15%	2092	1732
Nivelle	10 November 1813	38892	24240	38.40%	16.00%	16.47%	31.20%	2118	408
Nive	9 to 13 December 1813	N/A	N/A	N/A	43.00%	10.56%	22.55%	2673	2000
Orthez	27 February 1814	27098	17304	38.97%	24.00%	13.32%	30.58%	1645	529
Toulouse	10 April 1814	26186	13012	33.20%	20.00%	14.83%	25.89%	2103	533

The table above contains two columns displaying the percentage of British and Portuguese soldiers killed in battle. These columns were calculated and are shown on this table as a control value for the validity of the data. As is easily apparent, there are major differences between the British and Portuguese numbers, notably from the Battle of Salamanca onwards. According to the figures, the Portuguese soldiers were twice as much, and in Salamanca and Orthez two and a half times as much, more likely to be killed than wounded, when compared with their British companions, fighting in the same battlefield and against the same enemies.<sup>131</sup> Furthermore, and also according to Muir, 'In Napoleonic battles for which we have reliable statistics, the killed normally amount to between 10 and 20 per cent of the casualties', which, with the exception of Albuera, fits in nicely with the British casualties data, but disagrees with most of the Portuguese figures.<sup>132</sup> In fact, and starting with the battle of Salamanca, instead of reporting the numbers as they can be found in Wellington's

<sup>131</sup> This paragraph is also based on Muir *Salamanca*, Location 5493. In fact, if not for Muir's analysis I would not have noticed the discrepancies in the data, as they are not readily apparent to the untrained eye. I simply extended his analysis to a larger set of battles.

<sup>132</sup> Muir, *Salamanca*, Location 5493.

dispatches, as he had done until then, Oman commenced using what he termed 'corrected returns' for the Portuguese casualties. According to him, and when comparing the two sets of returns, 'Which of the returns is the more accurate it is hard to be sure, but a prima facie preference would naturally be given to the later and more carefully detailed document.'<sup>133</sup> What prompted Oman to take this decision will probably remain unknown, considering that his explanation is totally unsatisfactory. To give obvious preference to a set of returns that do not match, neither in concurrence, nor in numbers, the official dispatches is puzzling. A comparison between the two set of figures for Portuguese casualties at Salamanca best illustrates the issue, and is, therefore, shown below:

	Wellington's dispatch <sup>134</sup>	Corrected return <sup>135</sup>
Killed	304	506
Wounded	1552	1035
Missing	182	86
Total	2038	1627
% Killed	14.92%	31.10%

% Killed is calculated by dividing the number of Killed by the total number of casualties (including missing).

Wellington's figures show the percentage of 'Killed' within expected values and almost in parity with the British ones, when compared with the percentage in Table 1 (12.4%). There are also less 'Killed' than the numbers in the 'Corrected Return', which seems to point that the return is from a later date than the dispatch. This will cause a misrepresentation of the figures, in the sense that the number of killed will increase (as more of the wounded die), the number of wounded will decrease (as some soldiers die from their wounds and others return to their units) and the numbers of missing will also change, the further in time the numbers are from the day of battle.<sup>136</sup> To conclude, the numbers from Oman are not wrong per se, these returns do exist. They just happen to be the less correct set of figures of the two to compare with the British ones. For an author as meticulous and detailed with casualty figures as Oman, something amply illustrated throughout his work, this was indeed a strange departure from his usual accuracy. Apart from skewing the percentage of Killed, the 'corrected numbers' also decrease the total number of Portuguese casualties per battle, invalidating any analysis (see above, the Portuguese casualties go from 2,038 to 1,627). In plain English,

<sup>133</sup> Oman, *History of the Peninsular War*, Volume 5 p. 471.

<sup>134</sup> Muir, *Salamanca*, Location 5493

<sup>135</sup> Oman, *History of the Peninsular War*, Volume 5 pp. 598-599.

<sup>136</sup> Muir, *Salamanca*, Location 5493

comparing the British casualty figures from the official dispatches with the 'corrected returns' from Oman, is like comparing apples to oranges.

To bring the figures back to values which are comparable, the following was done (per battle):

- Salamanca: used the figures as provided by Muir in *Salamanca*;
- Vittoria: used the figures as provided in WD Volume 10, p. 453;
- Pyrenees: used the figures as provided by Oman, 1,102 from First Sorauren Volume 6 p. 770 plus 1,120 *ibid.* p. 771;
- Nivelle: used figures as provided in WD Volume 11, p. 285. To obtain the Portuguese casualties, the British were subtracted from the total;
- Nive: used figures from official dispatch, as described by Oman in Volume 7 p. 547;
- Orthez: used figures as provided in WD Volume 11, p. 540. To obtain the Portuguese casualties, the British were subtracted from the total;
- Toulouse: used figures as presented by Oman in Volume 7, p. 560 and subtracted 60 killed and added 250 wounded, as per his comment on the bottom of the page.

Plugging in the new casualty figures, provides the following results:

Battle	Date	#B.Troops	#P.Troops	%P.Troops	%P.Casualties	%B.Killed	%P.Killed	#B.Casualties	#P.Casualties
Buçaco	27 September 1810	28843	25429	48.60%	50.00%	16.61%	15.51%	626	626
Fuentes d'Onoro	5 May 1811	25474	12030	32.00%	17.00%	11.82%	20.84%	1497	307
Albuera	16 May 1811	10449	10201	49.40%	8.50%	21.20%	26.22%	4159	389
Salamanca	22 July 1812	30562	18017	37.00%	39.40%	12.40%	16.30%	3129	2038
Vittoria	21 June 1813	47612	26317	35.60%	23.10%	14.93%	14.29%	3475	1049
Pyrenees	28 to 30 July 1813	N/A	N/A	36.00%	51.50%	13.86%	N/A	2092	2222
Nivelle	10 November 1813	38892	24240	38.40%	21.40%	16.47%	10.57%	2118	577
Nive	9 to 13 December 1813	N/A	N/A	36.00%	47.00%	10.56%	15.62%	2673	2374
Orthez	27 February 1814	27098	17304	38.90%	27.50%	13.32%	10.71%	1645	625
Toulouse	10 April 1814	26186	13012	33.40%	25.60%	14.83%	10.78%	2103	723

Three main things are observable:

- 1) The Portuguese percentage of Killed falls to values much closer to the British ones, and within the range mentioned by Muir.
- 2) The number of Portuguese casualties goes up, also increasing the Percentage of Portuguese casualties in proportion to the British.
- 3) The British values do not shift, as no changes were made to them.

The table presented in the dissertation, is extracted from the table above.

Two final explanations on this topic are required: firstly, the Spanish were not considered in these calculations. The comparison that is being established is between the units of the Anglo-Portuguese army, irrespective if the Spanish were present or not. Secondly, for the battle of the Pyrenees and for the battle of the Nive, the percentage of Portuguese troops is a conjecture. Oman does not present any order of battle, and I do not have the means to calculate them.

## Appendix II

Portuguese troops behind the Lines in October 1810.

Oman, in his Volume 3, pp. 556-557, presents an estimate (dated 29 October 1810) of the number of Portuguese troops behind the Lines. The chart on which Oman based his estimate is presented below. Oman misunderstood the chart and misrepresented the Portuguese forces by around 4,000 men. Instead of using the column called 'Todas as praças', meaning all ranks, he used the column 'Todos', meaning all, but respecting only to soldiers and corporals, leaving out all officers, NCOs and other personnel.

In page 556, where it reads Total regulars of all arms: 24,539, it should read 27,548. In page 557, where it reads Total Militia, &c.: 11,092, it should read 12,368.



## Appendix III

This appendix contains three charts, by unit type, of the distribution of officers, both Portuguese and British throughout the different Portuguese regiments. The information has been extracted from the *Lista dos Officiaes do Exercito* em 1811, 1812 e 1813. The front page for the 1811 edition is also reproduced below. The number of British officers, and their percentage per unit, was calculated based on the information below. There were other British officers in the Portuguese army which were not attached to any specific unit, that being the case for General officers and their aides-de-camp.

## Cavalry:

1811			1812			1813		
1st Cavalry Rgt	Portuguese	English	1st Cavalry Rgt	Portuguese	English	1st Cavalry Rgt	Portuguese	English
Colonel	1		Colonel			Colonel		
Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel	1	1	Lieutenant Colonel	1	1
Major	2		Major	1		Major	3	
Captain	7	1	Captain	7	1	Captain	5	2
Lieutenant	8		Lieutenant	10		Lieutenant	16	
Ensign	8		Ensign	8		Ensign	3	
2nd Cavalry Rgt	Portuguese	English	2nd Cavalry Rgt	Portuguese	English	2nd Cavalry Rgt	Portuguese	English
Colonel	1		Colonel	1		Colonel	1	
Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel		
Major	1		Major			Major		
Captain	2	1	Captain	1	1	Captain	5	
Lieutenant	7		Lieutenant	5		Lieutenant	3	
Ensign	3	1	Ensign	3		Ensign	4	
3rd Cavalry Rgt	Portuguese	English	3rd Cavalry Rgt	Portuguese	English	3rd Cavalry Rgt	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel			Colonel		
Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel	1	1	Lieutenant Colonel	1	1
Major	2		Major	2		Major	2	1
Captain	2	1	Captain	3	1	Captain	7	
Lieutenant	3		Lieutenant	11		Lieutenant	11	
Ensign	8		Ensign	4		Ensign	7	
4th Cavalry Rgt	Portuguese	English	4th Cavalry Rgt	Portuguese	English	4th Cavalry Rgt	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel		1	Colonel		1
Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel	3		Lieutenant Colonel	2	
Major	1		Major	2		Major	2	
Captain	6	1	Captain	7	1	Captain	7	1

Lieutenant	8		Lieutenant	9		Lieutenant	14	
Ensign	7		Ensign	8		Ensign	9	
<b>5th Cavalry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>5th Cavalry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>5th Cavalry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel	1		Colonel			Colonel	1	
Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel			Lieutenant Colonel		
Major	1		Major	1		Major	1	
Captain	5	1	Captain	4		Captain	2	
Lieutenant	7		Lieutenant	4		Lieutenant	4	
Ensign	6		Ensign	2		Ensign		
<b>6th Cavalry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>6th Cavalry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>6th Cavalry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel			Colonel		
Lieutenant Colonel			Lieutenant Colonel	1	1	Lieutenant Colonel	1	1
Major	2		Major	2		Major	2	
Captain	4	1	Captain	5	2	Captain	6	2
Lieutenant	4		Lieutenant	13		Lieutenant	14	
Ensign	6		Ensign	5		Ensign	8	
<b>7th Cavalry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>7th Cavalry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>7th Cavalry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel	1		Colonel	1	
Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel	2		Lieutenant Colonel	2	
Major	1	1	Major			Major		
Captain	6		Captain	1		Captain	3	
Lieutenant	8		Lieutenant	4		Lieutenant	4	
Ensign	5		Ensign	4		Ensign	3	
<b>8th Cavalry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>8th Cavalry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>8th Cavalry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel			Colonel		
Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel			Lieutenant Colonel	1	
Major	1	1	Major	1		Major		
Captain	7		Captain	3		Captain	3	
Lieutenant	8		Lieutenant	4		Lieutenant	4	
Ensign	7		Ensign	7		Ensign		
<b>9th Cavalry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>9th Cavalry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>9th Cavalry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel			Colonel		
Lieutenant Colonel			Lieutenant Colonel			Lieutenant Colonel		
Major	1		Major	1		Major	2	
Captain	4		Captain	2		Captain	3	
Lieutenant	6		Lieutenant	5		Lieutenant	4	
Ensign	7		Ensign	8		Ensign	3	
<b>10th Cavalry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>10th Cavalry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>10th Cavalry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English

Colonel			Colonel			Colonel		
Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel			Lieutenant Colonel		
Major	1	1	Major	1		Major	1	
Captain	6	1	Captain	4		Captain	4	
Lieutenant	8		Lieutenant	3		Lieutenant	4	
Ensign	7		Ensign	3		Ensign	2	
<b>11th Cavalry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>11th Cavalry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>11th Cavalry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel			Colonel		
Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel	1	
Major	1		Major	1		Major	1	1
Captain	7		Captain	4		Captain	2	2
Lieutenant	8		Lieutenant	12		Lieutenant	13	
Ensign	7		Ensign	5		Ensign	5	
<b>12th Cavalry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>12th Cavalry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>12th Cavalry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel	1		Colonel			Colonel	1	
Lieutenant Colonel			Lieutenant Colonel	2		Lieutenant Colonel	1	
Major	1		Major	1		Major	2	
Captain	8		Captain	2		Captain	7	
Lieutenant	8		Lieutenant	14		Lieutenant	15	
Ensign	5		Ensign	4		Ensign	7	

Total	248	14	Total	225	10	Total	241	13
Grand Total	262		Grand Total	235		Grand Total	254	
%	94.66%	5.34%	%	95.74%	4.26%	%	94.88%	5.12%

## Line Infantry:

1811			1812			1813		
1st Infantry Rgt	Portuguese	English	1st Infantry Rgt	Portuguese	English	1st Infantry Rgt	Portuguese	English
Colonel	1		Colonel	1		Colonel		1
Lieutenant Colonel		2	Lieutenant Colonel	1	1	Lieutenant Colonel	1	1
Major	3		Major	1	1	Major	1	1
Captain	7	2	Captain	7	3	Captain	6	3
Lieutenant	10		Lieutenant	9		Lieutenant	9	
Ensign	20		Ensign	19	1	Ensign	17	2
<b>2nd Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>2nd Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>2nd Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel	1		Colonel	1	
Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel	1	1	Lieutenant Colonel		2
Major	1	1	Major	1	1	Major	1	1
Captain	5	3	Captain	5	3	Captain	7	2
Lieutenant	10		Lieutenant	11		Lieutenant	9	

Ensign			Ensign			Ensign		
	18			19			18	
<b>3rd Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>3rd Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>3rd Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel	1		Colonel	1		Colonel		1
Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel	1	
Major	1	1	Major	1	1	Major	1	1
Captain	7	2	Captain	7	2	Captain	7	2
Lieutenant	10		Lieutenant	8	1	Lieutenant	9	1
Ensign	19	1	Ensign	17	1	Ensign	19	
<b>4th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>4th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>4th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel			Colonel		
Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		2
Major	3		Major	1	1	Major	2	1
Captain	9	2	Captain	9	2	Captain	8	2
Lieutenant	8	1	Lieutenant	9	1	Lieutenant	9	1
Ensign	21		Ensign	16		Ensign	20	
<b>5th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>5th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>5th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel			Colonel		
Lieutenant Colonel	1	1	Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel	1	
Major	2	2	Major	2	1	Major	1	1
Captain	7	3	Captain	7	2	Captain	7	2
Lieutenant	10		Lieutenant	10		Lieutenant	10	
Ensign	13	2	Ensign	13	1	Ensign	21	1
<b>6th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>6th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>6th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel		1	Colonel		1	Colonel		1
Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel	1	1	Lieutenant Colonel		1
Major	3		Major	2		Major	2	
Captain	7	2	Captain	6	4	Captain	7	3
Lieutenant	10		Lieutenant	10		Lieutenant	10	
Ensign	18		Ensign	17		Ensign	19	
<b>7th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>7th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>7th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel	1		Colonel		1	Colonel		1
Lieutenant Colonel			Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel	1	
Major	1	1	Major	1	1	Major	1	1
Captain	7	3	Captain	6	2	Captain	7	2
Lieutenant	8		Lieutenant	9	1	Lieutenant	7	1
Ensign	17		Ensign	21		Ensign	19	
<b>8th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>8th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>8th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel	1	1	Colonel		1

Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel			Lieutenant Colonel		1
Major	1		Major	1	1	Major	1	1
Captain	7	3	Captain	7	3	Captain	6	3
Lieutenant	9	1	Lieutenant	8	1	Lieutenant	8	1
Ensign	17	1	Ensign	17	2	Ensign	15	2
<b>9th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>9th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>9th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel			Colonel		1
Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel	1	
Major	2	1	Major		2	Major		2
Captain	7	3	Captain	8	2	Captain	7	2
Lieutenant	9	1	Lieutenant	10	1	Lieutenant	9	1
Ensign	19		Ensign	17		Ensign	19	
<b>10th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>10th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>10th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel	1		Colonel	1		Colonel	1	
Lieutenant Colonel			Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		1
Major	3	1	Major	2	1	Major	1	1
Captain	8	1	Captain	6	2	Captain	6	2
Lieutenant	10		Lieutenant	10		Lieutenant	10	
Ensign	17		Ensign	18		Ensign	19	
<b>11th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>11th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>11th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel		1	Colonel		1	Colonel		
Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		1
Major	1	1	Major	2		Major	2	
Captain	7	2	Captain	8	2	Captain	7	1
Lieutenant	7		Lieutenant	10		Lieutenant	10	
Ensign	20		Ensign	20		Ensign	20	
<b>12th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>12th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>12th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel	1		Colonel		
Lieutenant Colonel	2		Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		1
Major	2	1	Major	1	1	Major	2	
Captain	8	2	Captain	6	2	Captain	7	2
Lieutenant	8	2	Lieutenant	8	1	Lieutenant	9	
Ensign	16	3	Ensign	15	1	Ensign	18	
<b>13th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>13th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>13th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel	1		Colonel	1	
Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel	1	
Major	1	1	Major	2		Major	1	1
Captain	6	2	Captain	8	2	Captain	9	1

Lieutenant	10		Lieutenant	8		Lieutenant	10	
Ensign	16		Ensign	19		Ensign	19	
<b>14th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>14th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>14th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel	1		Colonel	1		Colonel	1	
Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		2	Lieutenant Colonel		1
Major	2		Major	2		Major	2	
Captain	7	2	Captain	8	2	Captain	7	2
Lieutenant	8	1	Lieutenant	9	1	Lieutenant	8	2
Ensign	20		Ensign	19		Ensign	18	
<b>15th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>15th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>15th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel	1		Colonel	1		Colonel	1	
Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel	1	
Major		1	Major		2	Major	1	1
Captain	6	4	Captain	6	4	Captain	6	3
Lieutenant	8		Lieutenant	9		Lieutenant	8	
Ensign	19	2	Ensign	16		Ensign	20	
<b>16th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>16th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>16th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel	1	1	Colonel	2		Colonel	2	
Lieutenant Colonel			Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel	1	
Major	1	1	Major		2	Major	1	1
Captain	7	2	Captain	7	2	Captain	6	2
Lieutenant	10		Lieutenant	9		Lieutenant	7	
Ensign	19		Ensign	17		Ensign	15	
<b>17th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>17th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>17th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel		1	Colonel		1	Colonel		1
Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		1
Major	1	1	Major	1	1	Major		1
Captain	9	1	Captain	7	1	Captain	8	2
Lieutenant	8		Lieutenant	7		Lieutenant	8	1
Ensign	19		Ensign	20		Ensign	19	
<b>18th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>18th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>18th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel	1		Colonel	1		Colonel	1	
Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		1
Major	1	1	Major	1	1	Major	2	
Captain	8	2	Captain	8	2	Captain	7	2
Lieutenant	10		Lieutenant	8		Lieutenant	9	1
Ensign	19		Ensign	20		Ensign	18	

<b>19th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>19th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>19th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel		1	Colonel		1
Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel	1	
Major	3		Major	3		Major	2	
Captain	8	2	Captain	8	3	Captain	7	2
Lieutenant	9	1	Lieutenant	9	1	Lieutenant	9	1
Ensign	19		Ensign	19		Ensign	17	
<b>20th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>20th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>20th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel			Colonel		
Lieutenant Colonel			Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		1
Major	2		Major	2		Major	2	
Captain	9	1	Captain	9	1	Captain	8	
Lieutenant	10	1	Lieutenant	9	1	Lieutenant	8	1
Ensign	20		Ensign	20		Ensign	13	
<b>21st Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>21st Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>21st Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel	1		Colonel			Colonel	1	
Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		1
Major	1	1	Major	1	1	Major	2	
Captain	9	1	Captain	8	2	Captain	7	2
Lieutenant	8		Lieutenant	6	2	Lieutenant	9	1
Ensign	18		Ensign	19		Ensign	18	
<b>22nd Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>22nd Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>22nd Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel		1	Colonel		1	Colonel	1	
Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel	1	
Major	1		Major	1	1	Major	1	1
Captain	7	3	Captain	7	3	Captain	6	4
Lieutenant	9		Lieutenant	8	1	Lieutenant	10	
Ensign	14		Ensign	17	2	Ensign	14	1
<b>23rd Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>23rd Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>23rd Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel		1	Colonel		1	Colonel	1	
Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		1
Major	1	1	Major	1	1	Major	1	1
Captain	8	2	Captain	5	3	Captain	5	3
Lieutenant	10		Lieutenant	8		Lieutenant	9	
Ensign	20		Ensign	17		Ensign	19	
<b>24th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>24th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>24th Infantry Rgt</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel		1	Colonel		1	Colonel		1

Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel	1	
Major	1	1	Major	2	2	Major	2	2
Captain	7	3	Captain	7	2	Captain	7	3
Lieutenant	10		Lieutenant	11		Lieutenant	9	
Ensign	10		Ensign	20		Ensign	18	1

Total	881	107	Total	870	122	Total	864	114
Grand Total	988		Grand Total	992		Grand Total	978	
%	89.17%	10.83%	%	87.70%	12.30%	%	88.34%	11.66%


## Caçadores:

1811			1812			1813		
1st Caçadores Bn	Portuguese	English	1st Caçadores Bn	Portuguese	English	1st Caçadores Bn	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel			Colonel		
Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		1
Major	1		Major	1		Major	1	
Captain	5	1	Captain	5	1	Captain	5	1
Lieutenant	5		Lieutenant	6		Lieutenant	5	
Ensign	6		Ensign	4		Ensign	11	
2nd Caçadores Bn	Portuguese	English	2nd Caçadores Bn	Portuguese	English	2nd Caçadores Bn	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel			Colonel		
Lieutenant Colonel			Lieutenant Colonel			Lieutenant Colonel		1
Major		1	Major		1	Major		
Captain	4	2	Captain	4	2	Captain	4	1
Lieutenant	5		Lieutenant	6		Lieutenant	6	
Ensign	8		Ensign	10		Ensign	10	
3rd Caçadores Bn	Portuguese	English	3rd Caçadores Bn	Portuguese	English	3rd Caçadores Bn	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel			Colonel		
Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel	1	
Major	1		Major	1		Major	1	
Captain	5	1	Captain	4	2	Captain	3	2
Lieutenant	5	1	Lieutenant	5		Lieutenant	6	
Ensign	9		Ensign	6		Ensign	10	
4th Caçadores Bn	Portuguese	English	4th Caçadores Bn	Portuguese	English	4th Caçadores Bn	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel			Colonel		
Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		1
Major		1	Major		1	Major		1
Captain	3	2	Captain	5	1	Captain	3	1
Lieutenant	4		Lieutenant	6		Lieutenant	5	
Ensign	9		Ensign	12		Ensign	12	

<b>5th Caçadores Bn</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>5th Caçadores Bn</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>5th Caçadores Bn</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel			Colonel		
Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		1
Major	1		Major		1	Major		1
Captain	4	2	Captain	4	2	Captain	4	2
Lieutenant	6		Lieutenant	6		Lieutenant	6	
Ensign	6		Ensign	8		Ensign	11	
<b>6th Caçadores Bn</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>6th Caçadores Bn</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>6th Caçadores Bn</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel			Colonel		
Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel	1		Lieutenant Colonel		1
Major		1	Major		1	Major		1
Captain	3	2	Captain	3	3	Captain	3	3
Lieutenant	3	1	Lieutenant	5		Lieutenant	6	
Ensign	9		Ensign	9	1	Ensign	12	
<b>7th Caçadores Bn</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>7th Caçadores Bn</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>7th Caçadores Bn</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel			Colonel		
Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel	1	1	Lieutenant Colonel		1
Major	1	1	Major		2	Major		1
Captain	6	3	Captain	3	2	Captain	4	1
Lieutenant	8		Lieutenant	6		Lieutenant	4	
Ensign	8		Ensign	12		Ensign	9	
<b>8th Caçadores Bn</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>8th Caçadores Bn</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>8th Caçadores Bn</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel			Colonel		
Lieutenant Colonel			Lieutenant Colonel			Lieutenant Colonel		1
Major	1	1	Major		1	Major		1
Captain	2	2	Captain	2	3	Captain	3	1
Lieutenant	5		Lieutenant	7		Lieutenant	4	
Ensign	7	1	Ensign	7	1	Ensign	8	
<b>9th Caçadores Bn</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>9th Caçadores Bn</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>9th Caçadores Bn</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel			Colonel		
Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		1
Major	1		Major	1		Major	1	
Captain	2	2	Captain	2	2	Captain	2	2
Lieutenant	6		Lieutenant	6		Lieutenant	5	
Ensign	12		Ensign	11		Ensign	11	
<b>10th Caçadores Bn</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>10th Caçadores Bn</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>10th Caçadores Bn</b>	Portuguese	English

Colonel			Colonel			Colonel		
Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		
Major		1	Major		1	Major		1
Captain	3	1	Captain	5	1	Captain	4	1
Lieutenant	6		Lieutenant	5	1	Lieutenant	6	
Ensign	12		Ensign	10		Ensign	11	
<b>11th Caçadores Bn</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>11th Caçadores Bn</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>11th Caçadores Bn</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel			Colonel		
Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		1
Major		1	Major		1	Major		1
Captain	3	1	Captain	4	1	Captain	3	1
Lieutenant	5		Lieutenant	6		Lieutenant	6	
Ensign	12		Ensign	12		Ensign	11	
<b>12th Caçadores Bn</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>12th Caçadores Bn</b>	Portuguese	English	<b>12th Caçadores Bn</b>	Portuguese	English
Colonel			Colonel			Colonel		
Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		1	Lieutenant Colonel		
Major		1	Major			Major		1
Captain	2	1	Captain	4	1	Captain	4	1
Lieutenant	5		Lieutenant	4		Lieutenant	4	
Ensign	12		Ensign	11		Ensign	10	

Total	224	38	Total	230	42	Total	235	34
Grand Total	262		Grand Total	272		Grand Total	269	
%	85.50%	14.50%	%	84.56%	15.44%	%	87.36%	12.64%



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